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THE HEGEMONY OF THE COPYRIGHT TREATISE
Ann Bartow*
Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth.
- Albert Einstein'
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright laws do not reflect or support the social norms associated
with authorship and the creative process,2 or the actual use of copy-
righted works by consumers. Wealthy large-scale content owners en-
gage in "deal-making, log-rolling, interest-pandering, pork-barrelling,
horse-trading, and Arrovian cycling"4 with respect to Congress,5 and
undertake extensive public relations campaigns and serial law suits, a
multi-pronged strategy of "legislation, litigation and leg-breaking," 6 to
remold copyright laws, policies, and practices in their favor.7 Authors,8
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1. QuotesGalore: Authors, Albert Einstein, athttp://www.geodties.com/wattsl500/Einstein.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2005); see also Quotations: Albert Einstein, at http://www.conservativeforum
.org/authquot.asp?ID=27 (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
2. See, e.g., RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 79-81 (1996); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND CopYWRoNGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How
IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001).
3. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Elecfrifying Copyih*Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 13 (2003); Joseph P. Liu, Copyrht Law's 77teoey of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003).
4. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignit of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 640 (1995). This wonderfully
descriptive phrase is taken somewhat out of context from Waldron.
5. For a discussion of the legislative history of copyright laws, see, for example, Jessica Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989) [hereinafter Utman, Copyright Legislation
and Technological Change], andJessica D. Litman, Copgh, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 (1987) [hereinafter litman, Copyright, Comnpromise, and Legislative History].
6. Charles C. Mann, The Heaventy ,kebox, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2000, at 39, 42.
7. See, e.g., Brad King, DC Aunsh in Entertainment Cash, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 6, 2000, ("The
entertainment industry is pumping millions of doflars into the war chests of both major political parties,
vastly outspending both technology startups and individual artists. That could make it difficult for those 'little
guys' to get their messages across to legislators.") at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1 283,38407,00.htnl?tw=wnstory-related.
8. For example, Alice Randall, author of The Wind Done Com. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (1Ith Cir. 2001).
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academics,9 librarians" and public interest organizations" offer counter-
vailing pressure, sometimes successfully loosening the mechanisms of
control over information that content owners deploy,' 2 but generally
lack the financial resources and political influence needed to significantly
and permanently alter critical aspects of the copyright laws.
Meanwhile, there is another small cohort of players that wield
tremendous power over the substance and meaning of the copyright
laws: the authors of copyright treatises, whose unilateral ministrations
are not adequately noticed or appreciated. This Article asserts that
major conceptions about the appropriate structure, texture, and span of
copyright protections and privileges have been fashioned by copyright
treatises, particularly the various editions of]rimmer on Copyright.'3 Copy-
right treatises function in concert with the machinations of Congress, the
courts, and custom, but their role is not often scrutinized.
Because copyright treatises typically do a far betterjob than Congress
or the courts of explicating copyright law in straightforward and acces-
sible language, such treatises can not only communicate the copyright
law, but also influence its development and direction. Policy makers no
doubt understand that content owners and interest groups propose self-
serving agendas, and courts are well aware that the parties to litigation
all want to prevail when they advocate for particular legal conclusions.
A copyright treatise editor could similarly have an economic interest in
promoting particular interpretations of the law over others, but has no
obligation to disclose this. Because no goal beyond articulating copy-
right doctrine in a manner that invites further uses and purchases of the
pertinent treatise is facially evident, the tome has an appearance of
objectivity and detachment.
This Article critiques the excessive reliance placed on copyright
treatises by judges, lawyers, and even scholars and policy makers; ex-
plains why treatises in principle are not a legitimate source of positive
9. See, for example, the scholarship and advocacy work of academics such asJulie Cohen,Jessica
Litman, Pamela Samuelson, Larry Lessig, MargaretJane Radin, Margaret Chon, Yochai Benkler,Jonathan
Zittrain, Keith Aoki, Siva Vaidhyanathan, PeterJaszi, Mark Lemley, Dan Burk,Jamie Boyle, Sonia Katyal,
Rebecca Tushnet, Diane Zimmerman, Lydia Loren, and Malla Pollack.
10. See, e.g., The American Library Association, Copyright Issues, at
http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/copyrightb/copyright.htm (last updated Sept. 2, 2004); Mary
Minow at http://www.librarylaw.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
11. E.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Public
Knowledge, IPJustice, The Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Law Clinic.
12. See, e.g., Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 110(2), 112(l)
(West 1996 & Supp. 2004) ("Teach Act"); Tasini v. New York Times, 184 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11 th Cir. 2001).
13. E.g., 1-10 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &DAVIDNIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (updated through
2004) (hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT).
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law; 4 describes the potentially undemocratic consequences of incor-
rectly perceiving treatises as nonpartisan, status quo baselines of extant
copyright jurisprudence; and recommends an alternative approach to
charting and cataloging developments in copyright law-the establish-
ment and maintenance of a Restatement patterned after those promul-
gated by the American Law Institute in common law subject areas.
Additionally, though the primary focus of this Article concerns the
impact of copyright treatises on copyright law, many of the concerns
and criticisms raised in the copyright context here are equally applicable
to any legal subject area in which one treatise or other privately
authored secondary source is dominant, or in which a small group of
secondary sources receives large numbers of citations. While treatises
can be quite valuable, their impact on the law can actually be negative
if they are too heavily and unquestioningly relied on byjudges, lawyers,
scholars, and policy makers. Effective and appropriate utilization of any
given treatise requires an overt and deliberate assessment of the
substance and wisdom of the value choices it promulgates.
Part II of this Article describes the astounding and growing ubiquity
of the Nimmer treatise in modem copyright law-making and juris-
prudence, and the ways in which the treatise reinforces its own pre-
eminence. Part III asserts that uncritical, overwhelming use of a treatise
undermines the legitimacy of any legal norms that the treatise helps to
instantiate, by discouraging democratic debate and a more participatory
evolution of legal doctrine. Part IV argues that widespread adoption of
principles contained in the Nimmer treatise creates a normative illusion
of coherence in copyright law that too many lawyers and judges rely
upon unthinkingly. Part V suggests that the Nimmer treatise functions
as a de facto Restatement of Copyrights, despite the fact that it is pro-
duced quite differently, and has dissimilar goals, than Restatements
drafted by the American Law Institute. Part VI emphasizes the deleteri-
ous effect that a hegemonic treatise has upon the profile of legal scholar-
ship in the copyright law area. Part VII asks whether the hegemonic
treatise phenomenon is exceptional to copyright, or observable in other
legal subject areas as well. Finally, in Part VIII the Article concludes
that courts, lawyers, and policy-makers need to rely less on the Nimmer
14. For philosophical explorations of definitional aspects of "positive law," see generally Philippe
Nonet, What Is Positive Law?, 100 YALE LJ. 667 (1990), and Peter Berkowitz, On the Luws Governing Free Spirits
and Philosophers of thi Future: A Response to Nonet's "What Is Positive Law?", 100 YALE LJ. 701 (1990). The
construct of copyright as natural law is rejected without comment here, though as Ray Patterson has astutely
pointed out, this view seems to have surfaced in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcrofi, 537
U.S. 186 (2003). See Ray Patterson, Case Comment, Eldred v. Reno: An Example ofthe Law ofUnintended Conse-
quences, 8J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223 (2001).
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treatise, or any treatise, and that copyright law is worthy of its own
Restatement.
II. THE PREEMINENCE OFNIMMER ON COPyRIGHT
In 1963 Melville Nimmer, 5 a professor at the UCLA School of Law
with extensive practice experience in the entertainment industry,
published what later became a multi-volume treatise entitled Nimmer on
Copyright. 6 This work has had a profound effect on the development of
copyright law. One group of commentators stated:
[Melville Nimmer's] Treatise on Copyright is the definitive text; it is relied
upon by all whose activities take them into the world of publication-
authors, producers, lawyers, professors and all levels of the judiciary,
up to and including the Supreme Court of the United States. His
seminal work in the fields of intellectual property and right of publicity
determined the course of development of those areas of the law.17
Though the occasion of these observations was to memorialize
Melville Nimmer after his untimely death, it is neither exaggeration nor
puffery. lvimmer on Copyright is broadly viewed as "a comprehensive and
up-to-date treatise dedicated to copyright law,"'" and is frequently
referred to as "the leading treatise on copyright law."' 9 An annotated
15. See Darche Noam Institutions: Judaism in the Workplace, Professar Melvilk Bemard Jfmmer (2000)
[hereinafter P ofessor Melville Benard Xmswnerl, at http://www.darchenoam.org/ethies/pages/pmbrimmer
.htm.
16. As described in one commentary:
In 1962 [Melville Nimmer] joined the law faculty at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Although he was no longer in private practice on his own he continued to practice law and
was "of counsel" to other law firms. The year after becoming an academic, he published
what later became a four volume treatise A/iminer on Copright The treatise became the
"Bible" for copyright lawyers. The National LawJournal praised Mel Nimmer as the "King
of Copyright." For years AKuner on Copyright has been cited in virtually every reported
copyright decision.
Professor Melville BenardN'muner, supra note 15.
17. Norman Abrams et al., University of California: In Memoriam, Melville BernardAirne , Law: Los
Angeles (1986), at http://dynaweb.oac.cdlib.org:8088/dynaweb/uchist/public/inmemoriam/
inmemoriam 1986/@Generic_.BookTextView/4025.
18. See, e.g., Terry Cullen, Subject Guides to Research at SU Law Library: Copyright Law, at
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/library/startingpoints/copyright.html (last updated Nov. 18, 2003); see also
references to Xrnimer on Copyright on the William & Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law's Law Library
website, athttp://www.wm.edu/aw/lawlibrary/resarch/researcguides/rescarch-intcllcct.shtm (revised
Mar. 2004).
19. E.g., Michael Found. v. Urantia Found., 61 Fed. Appx. 538, 545 (10th Cir. 2003); Mackie v.
Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 915 (9th Cir. 2002); TransWestern Puhl'g Co. LP v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., 133
F.3d 773, 782 (10th Cir. 1998); MacLean Assoc., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d
769, 778 (3d Cir. 1991); Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558(9th Cir. 1990); Loree Rodkin
Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315F. Supp. 2d 1053,1054 (C.D. Cal. 2004); In re Golden Books Family
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legal bibliography describes the work, quite typically, as follows: "Con-
sidered an authoritative source for information on copyright ....
Nimmer is the field's standard reference treatise and is frequently cited
by United States and foreign courts at all levels (including the U.S.
Supreme Court) as an authority to justify their opinions."2  The
Nimmer treatise itself boasts:
The present four-volume work attests to the subtle rapture that
Professor Nimmer derived from mastering and dominating his field.
The wealth ofjudicial citations to his name pays tribute to the power,
barely postponed, that he wielded. The Supreme Court's last major
copyright decision during Mel Nimmer's lifetime proves the point-
the majority opinion in Harper & Row v. Nation though disagreeing
with his position, contains a score of citations to Professor Nimmer; its
dissent invokes his name a half-dozen times. (Another Supreme Court
decision from last term, Mills Music v. Snyder even cites to the 1978
Preface, so definitive did Mel Nimmer's every word become.)2
The explicit focus on the Nimmer treatise here and throughout this
commentary is not intended to suggest that this particular treatise is
qualitatively better or worse than any other copyright treatise, or any
secondary source generally. Its popularity and omnipresence simply
render it totemically illustrative of the powerful impact a treatise can
have on the legislation and jurisprudence of a complicated area of the
law.
A. Nimmer and Congress
Congressional affection and respect for treatise originator Melville
Nimmer is apparent from the fact that his death was reported on the
floor of the U.S. Senate with the sobriquet: "Like Prosser, Wigmore,
and Williston, Professor Nimmer's name is synonymous with an entire
body of law. His four-volume treatise, 'Nimmer on Copyright,' has
been cited countless times by the courts, and is universally regarded as
Entm't, 269 B.R. 311, 317 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); Telecomm Tech. Servs. v. Siemens Rolm Communica-
tions, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1325 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Video Aided Instruction, Inc. v. Y & S Express, Inc.,
No. 96 CV 518 (CBA), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18477 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1996); Jonettejewelry Co. v.
Weiman Co., No. 90 C 0172, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5518 (N.D. II. Apr. 24, 1991); Steege v. AT & T (In
re Superior Toy & Mfg. Co.), 183 B.R. 826, 833 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); Moore Pub., Inc. v. Big Sky Mktg,
Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1371, 1374 (D. Idaho 1990); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Mgmt. Assistance, Inc., No.
81-1295, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19515 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983).
20. Ryn Nasser, Anwtaed Bibliography for The New York Times v. Tasin, at
http://www.ils.unc.edu/-nassk/itflsl 10/biblio.html (last updatedJune 9, 2002).
21. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRLIGHT, supra note 13, at xi (2001).
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an indispensable reference by virtually every practitioner in this field."22
The New York imes obituary of Melville Nimmer was reprinted in the
Congressional Record. His influence on congressional copyright
policy makers is evident. A law review article by Melville Nimmer was
cited in the legislative history of what eventually became the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992,24 and a legal memo he wrote on behalf
of the National Music Publishers' Association and Recording Industry
Association of America was cited in the legislative history of this Act as
well.
The Nimmer treatise is a resource Congress recurrently references
when making and evaluating changes to copyright legislation. In recent
years the Nimmer treatise provided the definition of "joint authorship"
in a failed attempt to clarify the "work for hire" doctrine 26 and was cited
for the proposition that U.S. copyright terms were too short to comply
with treaty obligations under the Berne Convention, lending support for
22. 131 CONG. REc. 35,378 (1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias). The entire speech was as follows:
Mr. President, on November 23, the field of copyright law lost its most authoritative scholar
and commentator. Prof. Melville B. Nimmer, who died last month in Los Angeles at the age
of 62, was the undisputed giant of American copyright law.
Like Prosser, Wigmore, and Williston, Professor Nimmer's name is synonymous
with an entire body of law. His four-volume treatise, "Nimmer on Copyright," has been
cited countless times by the courts, and is universally regarded as an indispensable reference
by virtually every practitioner in this field. Although Professor Nimmer was an
acknowledged expert on the first amendment, and on entertainment law matters, it is in
copyright above all that his passing leaves a void that can never be entirely filled.
His stature is aptly summarized by the headline that accompanied a profile of
Professor Nimmer in the October 10, 1983 edition of the "National Law Journal": "The
Man Who Wrote the Book: Melville B. Nimmer is the King of Copyright."
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the
Committee on theJudiciary, I know that Mel Nimmer will be missed. I speak for all Senators
in extending my condolences to Mrs. Nimmer and to the rest of his family.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Video andAudio Home Taping: Hearing on de Home Recording Act of 1983 Before the Subcomm. on Patients,
Copyghts, and Trademarks and the Senate Comm. on the Jiudiciay, 98th Cong. 115, 245 (1983) (Appendix to
submission entitle Audio Home Tapitg: The Case for a Fair Deal for Copyighi Ouners and Conosnunrs).
25. Id.
26. 135 CONG. REc. 13,153 (1989) (statement ofSen. Cochran):
The fundamental characteristic ofjoint authorship is "ajoint laboring in furtherance of a pre-
concerted common design." Amuner on Copyright, § 6.03 (1988). As joint authors are con-
sidered to be coowners in the work, 17 U.S.C. § 20 1(a) (1982), they are treated as tenants in
common. They own an undivided interest in the whole of the work in proportion to the
number of co-owners and not in relation to the relative importance of their respective con-
tributions, and may independently use or license the work, subject only to a duty to account
to the other coowner for any profits earned thereby. Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir.
1984). While a joint author may not transfer all interest in the work without the express
written consent of the otherjoint author(s), he or she may transfer all of his or her undivided
interest to a third party who then stands in the shoes of that joint author for all purposes.
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ultimate passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act." While most
observers would credit large content owners with convincing Congress
to extend the term of copyright protections rather than any treatise,28
the Nimmer treatise offered tacitly "neutral" support to the pro-
extension arguments proffered by obviously self-interested copyright
holders and was explicitly referenced by Congress as a legitimizing basis
for term extension.
According to his son David, Melville was a productive legislator:
For on one important occasion when Congress was deliberating the
Copyright Act of 1976, it heard testimony from Professor Nimmer and
engaged him in fruitful colloquy-as had the Copyright Office in its
time before that. In addition, from 1975 to 1978, he served as vice-
chairman of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU). That blue-ribbon panel issued a Final
Report bringing U.S. copyright law into the computer age. Its
handiwork continues to set the stage for cases being litigated and for
new legislative initiatives. In fact, properly viewed, the contribution
of CONTU to copyright lawmaking is nothing less than epochal.29
On behalf of his clients, the Turner Broadcasting System and the
National Association of Broadcasters, David Nimmer, the current editor
of the treatise, testified before Congress concerning a proposed
amendment of the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act to permit the
commercial monitoring of news programming.3°  He similarly
represented the U.S. Telephone Association during congressional
27. E-g., 141 CONG. REc. 6652 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch):
Since the Stockholm Act ofJuly 14, 1967, the Berne Convention has recognized the need for
an outer limit on the protection of anonymous and pseudonymous works by providing that,
"The countries of the Union shall not be required to protect anonymous or pseudonymous
works in respect of which it is reasonable to presume that their author has been dead for fifty
years." Art. 7(3). It has been argued that the American provision setting an outer limit of
100 years of protection for anonymous and pseudonymous works is in violation of the Berne
Convention, see Nimmer, "Copyright" §9.01 [D], at least with respect to works whose
country of origin is not the United States. By increasing the maximum protection from its
current 100 years to a period of 120 years, the Copyright Term Extension Act will at least
serve to reduce greatly the number of potential situations in which our law may operate in
violation of the Berne Convention. This for the reason that it is far more reasonable to
presume that an author who created a work 120 years ago may have been deceased for 50
years, than it is to presume that the author of a work created only 100 years ago may have
been deceased for at least 50 years.
28. &eJon M. Garon, Media and Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace
of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 491, 522-28 (1999); John Soloman, Rhapsody in Green, BOSTON
GLOB,Jan. 3, 1999, at E2; Dennis S. Kasala, Opposing Copyright Extension, at http://www.law.asu.edu/
HomePages/Kajala/OpposingCopyrightExtension (last updated Nov. 30, 2004).
29. David Nimmer, Codjiig CoysightCompreienh , 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004) (footnote
omitted).
30. 138 CONG. REC. D729 (daily ed.June 16,1992).
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hearings on the No Electronic Theft Act.3 ' It is reasonable to assume
that part of his value to his clients in the context of congressional
hearings is derived from his authorship of, and association with, his
treatise. In one telling bit of reductive circularity, David Nimmer wrote
in a scholarly article that, "[t] he literature reveals that judges, treatise
writers, and other commentators offer a host of different explanations
for how fair use cases actually get decided, apart from the four factors
[of Section 107 of the Copyright Act]."2 He supports his claim about
"judges"- by listing topical articles written by four different federal
judges.3" He supports his claim about "other commentators" by refe-
rencing five scholarly articles on fair use (one of which was co-authored
by a federal judge but not incorporated into the prior citation).3 4 The
footnote connected to "treatise writers," however, begins, "[m]y own
opinion is that the fourth factor is the most important," and then cites
only to the pertinent provisions of the Nimmer treatise. 5
Moreover, even if David Nimmer chooses to represent only clients
whose interests are in harmony with the normative proscriptions of the
treatise, his dynamic legal practice arguably complicates and inhibits
31. Copyright Piracy, and H.R 2265, the No Electronic Theft (NE2) Act, Subcomm. on Courts and




32. David Nimmer, "FairestofThrnAll"and OtherFaig Tales of Fair Ue, 66 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS.
263, 267 (2003).
33. Id at 267 n.24:
Fair use may be unique among copyright doctrines in having inspired numerous Second
Circuit judges to join battle on the issue not only in their judicial opinions, but also in the
pages of the reviews. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Comnmentay: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990); RogerJ. Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play?, 37
J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 1 (1989); Jon 0. Newman, Not the End of Histoy: The Second Circuit
Stgglks with Fair Use, 37J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 12 (1989); James L. Oakes, Copyrights and
Copyremnedics: Unfair Use and Injuctions, 38J. COPYRIGH1r Soc'Y 63 (1990). As the Second
Circuit itself notes about its members' scholarly contributions: "Some of these articles are
highly critical of the state of the law with respect to the fair use doctrine and offer suggestions
for improvement." New Era Publ'ns Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 155
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990). In that spirit, Second CircuitJudges Oakes, Leval,
and Miner were among the witnesses to testify before Congress regarding an amendment to
the fair use doctrine. See H.R. REP. No. 102-836 (1992).
34. Id at 267 n.26 ("Rg., William W. Fisher Ill, Reconstnecting the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1661 (1988); Wendy Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis oJthe Betansax Case
and Its Prtedecessors, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 1600,1614-22 (1982); Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, W4hiat's
So FairAbout Fair Use? The 1999 Donald C Brace Memorial Lecture, 46J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 513 (1999); Karen
Burke LeFevre, The Tell-Tale "Hwear": Detennining "Fair" Use of Unpublished Texts, 55 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS.
153, 165 (Spring 1992); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair A Comennton the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1137 (1990).").
35. Id at 267 n.25 ("My own opinion is that the fourth factor is the most important. 4 NIMMER, suipra
note 1, § 13.05[A][4]. But 'even if viewed as central, this factor cannot substitute for an evaluation of each
ofthe four statutory factors.' Id at 13-182. To flesh out application of the fourth factor, my father proposed
application of the 'functional test' to determine ifa given usage is fair. See id § 13.05[B].").
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making any substantive changes to the treatise that he might otherwise
contemplate.3" This criticism would apply equally to any treatise author
actively representing clients.
B. Copious Citations by Courts
Quantification of the number of times the Nimmer treatise has been
cited by federal courts in published opinions via online legal databases
is inexact at best, but conservatively exceeds 2000 citations,37 17 by the
Supreme Court alone.38 One might assume that quantity of copyright
cases has escalated in the past decade or so, given the increasing pro-
minence that copyright litigation has received in the media, but in fact
the number of copyright cases filed in U.S. district courts has remained
relatively constant over the past 15 years, as the following list reveals:

















However, the number ofjudicial citations to the Nimmer treatise has
demonstrably risen substantially over time. In the first five years of its
36. David Nimmer discusses a few of the clients he has represented in copyright cases. l. at 263.
37. The Boolean search "Nimmer w/5 copyright!" and then configured to exclude unrelated citations
concerning scholarly works of University of Houston School of Law Professor Raymond Nimmer e.g. by
using the command "and not (Ray! w/3 Nimmer)" in the federal courts database on LexisNexis uncovered
2,067 results on January 12, 2005. Admittedly some of these citations may reference David Nimmer's
scholarly works that have the work "copyright" in the title or nearby, but few law review articles are cited
by courts in this area generally, so that number is likely to be small.
38. Searched performed on Wesdaw onJanuary 12, 2005.
39. Analytical Services Office, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,Judicial Facts and Figures,
at Table 2.2, Civil Cases Filed by Nature of Suit, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/contents
.html.
590 UNIVER SIThOF CLVCJNNA 77 LA W REVIEW [Vol. 73
publication, 1963 to 1967, the Nimmer treatise was cited 46 times. The
following five-year period, 1968 to 1972, saw 56 citations.' Citations
in the federal courts over the next thirty years, broken into five-year
intervals, increased as follows:
1973 through 1977: 111 citations
1978 through 1982: 194 citations
1983 through 1987: 325 citations
1988 through 1992: 359 citations
1993 through 1997: 398 citations
1998 through 2002: 451 citations
There have been 236 additional citations since January 1, 2003
alone.41 Similarly high citation figures are obtained when the law
reviews and barjournals databases are separately searched, 2 suggesting
that legal scholars and practitioner authors also rely on, or at least refer
to, the Nimmer treatise quite extensively. 43 Though citation rates may
not be perfectly, or even closely correlated with the qualitative impor-
tance of a treatise, at least as a quantitative matter Nvunmer on Copyright
appears to exert a pervasive influence upon everyone who comes into
contact with copyright law, far surpassing the citation levels of
competing treatises by tremendous margins, almost tenfold in federal
case law, and almost threefold in law reviews and legal periodicals."
40. Numbers ascertained and confirmed by multiple date-restricted Boolean searches on LexisNexis
and Wesdaw legal databases using the search terms Nimmer and copyright, excluding the works of the
unrelated Professor Raymond Nimmer.
41. By contrast, the competing Goldstein treatise was cited 17 times during this interval, and 69 times
between 1998 and 2003. Numbers based on a Wesdaw search conducted on January 12, 2005.
42. The Boolean search "Nimmer w/5 copyright!" returned 1,767 results onJanuary 12, 2005, on
Lexis. As with the search of federal case law, the search was configured to exclude unrelated citations
concerning scholarly works of University of Houston School of Law Professor Raymond Nimmer, for
example, by using the command "and not (Ray! w/5 Nimmer)." On January 12, 2005 searches on
LexisNexis returned the following results:
US & Canadian Law Reviews: 1737;
US Law Reviews, CLE, Legal Journals & Periodicals, Combined: 2227;
US Law Reviews & ALR: 1620.
A search within the Westlaw databases for all federal cases and all law reviews, texts, and bar
journals produced 5,696 documents on January 12, 2005.
43. *ee, e.g., WendyJ. Gordon, Toward a juisprudence of Benefits: The Aoms of Copyright and the Problem
of Ptivate Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1010:
In my view at least three pre-1976 works mark the transition to a broader sort of copyright
scholarship. One was Benjamin Kaplan's An Unhurried View of Copyright, an exploration
simultaneously leisurely and incisive of copyright's history, context, and policies. Another
was Stephen Breyer's important investigation of copyright's economic justifications. A third
was Melville Nimmer's treatise, which better than any reference work before it provided a
thorough and analytic guide to the area.
(footnotes omitted).
44. For example, searches in the federal case database on January 26, 2004 suggest that while
Nimmer has been cited 2097 times, the next, Goldstein, was cited only 218 times; the Latman/Patry
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The Copyright Act45 is a long and dense body of statutory law. Des-
pite its length and complexity and the wide range of issues it addresses,
however, the statute does not answer many questions or create much
predictability when disputes about copyrights arise.' As a result,judges
must either read extensive amounts of copyright case law and distill
from it nuanced rules and complicated principles, or they can expe-
diently choose to rely on the formulations that are conveniently and
accessibly set out in a treatise, and confidently apply them to the often
thorny facts of a particular dispute. The considerable number of
citations to the Nimmer copyright treatise suggests it is widespread and
commonplace for federal judges to depend on the treatise to articulate
and support copyright law decisions.47
It is possible, of course, that judges decide cases before even opening
a treatise and simply augment their own reasoning with the canned
analyses that treatises provide by plugging in treatise citations as matters
of efficiency and convenience. Judges function as a lawmaking com-
munity that shares a set of interpretive strategies in common, however,
and if nothing else, extensive citations signal to otherjurists and the legal
community at large that copyright treatises, Nimmer in particular,
warrant foundational and dispositional reliance.48
In their essay on the ecology of citation practices by academics in the
context of legal scholarship, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson observed
that frequent citation or quotation is more than simple repetition, it "is
a 'recommendation of value' that 'not only promotes but goes some
distance toward creating the value of that work.' '49  Citations and
quotations, they noted, not only draw attention to a work, but also make
treatise about 154 times, Boorstyn about 28 times; and Abrams only 6 times. Searches oflaw reviews and
periodicals uncovered 2,423 citations to Nimmer, 821 citations to Goldstein, 398 citations to Latman/Patry,
96 citations to Abrams, and 61 citations to Boorstyn.
45. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101-1332 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004).
46. See generally LITMAN, supra note 2; Bartow, supra note 3; UewellynJoseph Gibbons, Stop Mucking
Up Copyrght. A Common Law Solution, 35 RUTGERS LJ. 959 (2004).
47. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
48. For example, in Ployboy Entertainmen4 Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993),Judge
Harvey E. Schlesinger cited the Nimmer treatise seven times in a relatively short opinion and actually quoted
the treatise for language that the treatise itself was quoting from the Copyright Act of 1976, rather than
quoting or citing to the statute itself. See idi at 1557 ("A 'public display' is a display 'at a place open to the
public or ... where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social
acquaintances is gathered.' 2 MELLviLLE B. NIMMER, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.14[C], at 8-169 (1993)."
(omission in original)).
Consider also the concise Second Circuit opinion in Eli Attia v. Sociefy of tme New TorkHospital, 201
F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1999), which cited the Nimmer treatise six times to support fundamental tenets of copyright
law, such as the principles that facts and ideas cannot be copyrighted. Although case law, the copyright
statute, and another treatise were also cited, the Nimmer treatise is the most heavily relied upon authority.
49. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CIi.-KENT L. REV. 843,
844 (1996).
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the work more likely to be perceived and experienced as valuable.50
Works gain status from frequent citation and quotation and also "start
to affect the very environment in which they are reproduced, like a
particularly successful biological species."'" Space in the minds of the
members of an interpretive community is a limited and valuable
resource, they argue, and when a canonical work gains a substantive
presence in that space, it creates an increasingly hospitable environment
for its own reproduction in the minds of future community members,
"whose own minds are constructed and stocked through cultural trans-
mission from their colleagues and elders."'52 In consequence, "the
canonical work begins increasingly not merely to survive within but to
shape and create the culture in which its value is produced and
transmitted and, for that very reason, to perpetuate the conditions of its
own flourishing."5 Abundant citations in judicial opinions signal that
a treatise is beneficial, which in turn leads to even more bountiful
citations and supplementary reputation enhancement in the courts and
among practicing attorneys.
C. The Information Infrastructure Task Force
When the Clinton Administration issued its controversial "White
Paper" 54 on the National Information Infrastructure in 1995, s" the final
report cited iimmer on Copyright 11 times. The Nimmer treatise was used
to substantiate an exposition of the "doctrine of limited publication";
56
to provide an endorsement of the assertion that "[ilt has long been clear
under U.S. Law that placement of copyrighted material into a com-
puter's memory is a reproduction of that material";57 to supply the sole
50. Id at 844-45.
51. Id at 845.
52. Id
53. Id (quoting BARBARA HERNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE 50 (1988)).
54. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, INTELLECrTUALPROPERTYANDTHENATIONALINFORMATION INFRASTRUrURE: THE REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER],
avaiiable at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnhi/.
55. The White House formed the Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) to articulate and
implement the Administration's vision for the National Information Infrastructure (NIl). Se The Natioanal
Infonnaion Infosautu.m. Agenda for Action, Mission Statement, at http://www.ibibfio.org/nii/NII-Task-
Force.html.
56. See WHITE PAPER, supia note 54, at 31 & n.80-8 I.
57. Id at 64-65 & n.202. This arguably became the law afterwards, receiving legislative affirmation
in the DMCA. As one commentator stated:
In 1995, a Working Group appointed by the Clinton administration issued a White Paper
that set forth a proposed framework for adapting intellectual property rights to the online
environment, what the White Paper called the "National Information Infrastructure" (NII).
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support for the statement that whatever the nature of an unauthorized
use of a copyrighted work, "generally it may not constitute a fair use if
the entire work is reproduced";" to validate, in concert with the
Goldstein treatise,59 a definition of substantial similarity that broadly
encompassed non-literal copying and paraphrasing;60 to emphasize,
again together with the Goldstein treatise, the importance of a strict lia-
bility approach to copyright infringement; 61 to reinforce the contention
that nonexclusive licenses can be implied from conduct,62 a legal prin-
ciple that the Nimmer treatise arguably actually created itself, as is
explained below; 3 and to provide confirmation for a claim that in the
United States, authors' "moral rights" were protected, as required by
the Berne Convention, via provisions of the Copyright Act, Lanham
Act, and the common law of privacy, defamation and "the like."' All
of these contentions are, to varying degrees, contested, both by other
commentaries and by contrary case law; at a minimum the issues are
more nuanced and complicated than they are made to appear. 65 One
Citing the MA decision, the White Paper asserted that it has "long been clear under U.S.
law" that RAM copies of copyrighted works, as well as any other incidental copies made
during the transmission of such works through the Internet, implicated the copyright owner's
exclusive right of reproduction. The White Paper then went on to suggest "minor
clarification[s] and limited amendment[s]" to copyright law that would merely reinforce the
settled view.
Reflecting the view of the White Paper, the result in AL4 now appears to have received
legislative affirmation in the recently enacted DMCA.
Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Owmership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1245, 1261 (2001) (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original).
58. WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 79 & n.249.
59. 1-4 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYtIGHT (Aspen 2d ed. 1998) (1989).
60. WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 102-03 & n.321-22.
61. Id at 120 & n.385. In addition to providing supplemental support for the Nimmer treatise, the
Goldstein treatise was independently referenced in conjunction with assertions about the impact of strict
liability for copyright infringement upon intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers. See id at 117,
n.375, 123 n.393.
62. Id at 129 n.424.
63. See infia notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
64. WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 133-34 & n.428.
65. See, eg.,John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003)
(discussing doctrine of limited publication and stating that case law before 1976 concerning the definition
of publication for copyright purposes "includessjudicially crafted exceptions for limited publication: restricted
distribution of the work that does not qualify as publication or trigger the notice requirement. Limited publi-
cation 'occurs when tangible copies of the work are distributed, but to a limited class of persons and for a
limited purpose."'). Several commentators have questioned or even strongly criticized the proposition that
receipt in a computer's random access memory entails making a "copy." See, e.g.,Jessica Litman, The Exclu-
sive Right to Read 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 29, 40 (1994) (protesting result in which all acts of reading
or viewing a digitalized work with the use of computer involves "actionable reproduction"); David Post, New
W~ne, Old Bottles: The Case of the Eanescent Copy, AM. LAW., May 1995, at 103, (questioning); Pamela
Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The.N1 Intellectual Property Report, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994,
at 21 (criticizing).
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would never know that from reading the White Paper, however, as both
the text of the report and its associative footnotes are linguistically struc-
tured to suggest balance, neutrality, and objectivity, not unlike a treatise
itself in some respects. Like the judicial opinions, statutory language,
and snippets of legislative history cited or quoted in the White Paper, the
Nimmer and Goldstein treatises are referenced as if their authority was
incontrovertible.
Courts have ruled that there is no per se rule against copying in the name of fair use an entire
copyrighted work if necessary. See Sony Corp. ofrAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
Chi. Bd. ofEduc. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811
(9th Cir. 2003); Ty, Inc. v. Pub'ns. Int'l Ltd, 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992).
Not even "actual copying" will always support a claim of substantial similarity. See, e.g., Yankee
Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001). A relatively narrow scope of copyright
protection has been adopted by several courts. In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,
831 F. Supp. 202,209 (D.Mass. 1993) (Lotus IV),Judge Keeton referred to the scope ofcopyright protection
as a sliding scale that changes with the availability of expressions for a given idea, and he impliedly accorded
computer interfaces only a narrow protection. Noting that the menu commands and menu structure of the
computer spreadsheet program in that case were highly functional, Judge Keeton emphasized that the
defendant had infringed by copying verbatim Lotus's entire command menu hierarchy despite the
availability of many different command structures to perform the same functions. Id; see also Eng'g
Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th Cir. 1994); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (determining infringement ofnonliteral elements of computer
program: "Even for works warranting little copyright protection, verbatim copying is infringement."); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (determining scope of
infringement for user interface) ("[l]f technical or conceptual constraints limit the available ways to express
an idea . . . copyright law will abhor only a virtually-identical copy of the original."); Digital
Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (finding
infringement in a computer program's status screen which was "virtually identical" with the plaintiffs);
Harcourt Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517,525 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (according
narrow scope of protection to answer sheet designed to be optically scanned by computers).
Even the Nimmer treatise argues for a narrow scope of copyright in some circumstances. See, e.g.,
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 13.03[B] [2] [b] (2004) ("If the only original aspect of a work lies
in its literal expression, then only a very close sinsilarity, verging on the identical, will suffice to constitute an
infringing copy." (citing caselaw for support)). Commentators have argued that narrow constructions of
substantial similarity best serve the goals of copyright law. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Copyght and Creative Copying,
I OTrAWA L. & TECH.J. 75 (2003-2004).
Courts have held that copyright infringement is not truly strict liability, unlike patent
infringement, but requires at least intent to copy, although not intent to infringe. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA
Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997); Pritikin v. Liberation Pubis., Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 920
(N.D. Il. 1999); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Col. 1999) ("Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of volition
or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.")
See generally Deborah Ross, The United States Jains the Bem Conventimo New Obligationsfor Authors'
Moral Rights?, 68 N.C.L REV. 363 (1990); Susan Tiefenbrun, A Hienneneati Methodology and How Pirates Read
and Misread the Berne Convention, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1 (1999).
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D. Invisible Influence
Quantifying citations to a treatise does not gauge the number of times
it is consulted as a behind-the-scenes analytic tool with which to launch
research or confirm research results before arriving at a holding that is
then bolstered with actual case law, which one suspects is sometimes
cribbed from the treatise's citations and footnotes without much inde-
pendent authentication. In consequence, the impact of copyright
treatises is probably far greater than even the vast number of citations
to them indicate. Treatise influence is likely to increase in the future as
legal researchers continue to abandon paper for electronic sources and
copyright treatises become increasingly accessible and fully searchable
online.66
E. An Infinite Loop of Logrolling
67
In addition to the perhaps rational and justifiable grounds on which
courts turn to copyright treatises so frequently, there may be subsidiary
and far less laudable reasons that a treatise is sometimes explicitly refe-
renced. A number of former federal court clerks have privately obser-
ved that when copyright cases arose, they were encouraged by their
judges to "game the system" and incorporate citations to the Nimmer
treatise in written court opinions. This enhanced the possibility that
these opinions would in turn be incorporated into the Nimmer treatise,
with appended self-referential and self-congratulatory parentheticals
such as "treatise cited" or "treatise quoted." In this context, citing to the
Nimmer treatise serves dubious ego-related goals of blunt reputation
enhancement ofjudges, rather than advancing the interests of copyright
justice. It also givesjudges eager to elevate the visibility of their opinions
an added incentive to cite the Nimmer treatise, for reasons wholly
unrelated to its analytical merits. The electronic version of the Nimmer
treatise that is searchable on LexisNexis lists almost 200 "treatise citing"
cases, and nearly as many "treatise quoting" cases.6"
66. The complete Nimmer treatise is available and searchable on LexisNexis, at http://www.lexis-
nexis.com (password necessary).
67. Webster's 1913 Dictionary defined this term as, "[a] combining to assist another in consideration
of receiving assistance in return; -- sometimes used ofa disreputable mode of accomplishing political schemes
or ends." See Hyperdictionary: English Dictionary, available at http://ww.hyperdictionary.com/dictionary
/logrolling.
68. Searches performed on LexisNexis onJanuary 12, 2005. Search words of"treatise w/4 quotes
or quoted (quot!)" retrieved "treatise quoting" 145 times. Search words of "treatise w/4 cites or cited (cit!)"
retrieved "treatise citing" 191 times.
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Nimmer is far from the only treatise guilty of this practice and is
singled out here as an example simply because former federal clerks
were specifically asked about the Nimmer treatise for the purpose of this
section of the Article. Other copyright treatises, and treatises in many
other subject areas, similarly appear to engage in and encourage circular
logrolling of this sort. At a minimum, it creates jurisprudential "noise,"
and fosters unappealingly self-serving behavior.
III. BROAD RELIANCE ON TREATISES UNDERMINES THE
LEGITIMACY OF LEGAL NORMS
When putative lawmaking is actually a series of references to, and
applications of, the dictates of a treatise, the process is flawed and the
outcome is suspect. Though the effect of over reliance on a treatise may
appear to be as mundane as the facilitation of slovenly research and
short-circuited analysis, if undertaken on a large scale treatise usage
begins to supplant the democratic process, with destructive effects. This
is not intentional on the part of treatise authors and it is not something
treatise producers could easily prevent without undermining their own
credibility and sales. The responsibility lies with those researchers who
use treatises as a shortcut rather than a supplemental resource.
A. Facilitation ofFacileAnaylsis
In the context of biology, the late Stephen jay Gould warned of the
detrimental tendency to equate the scientific method with abstract
inquiry because one generally only undertakes substantive research
when looking for something particular, and one's goal is bound to affect
one's search.69 Science, Gould suggested, involves a "balancing act
between objective methods and subjective goals."7  Like scientific
inquiry, the objectives of legal research may drive the scope and sophis-
tication of the manner in which it is pursued.7 The anticipated com-
plexity of the answers will govern the degree of intricacy with which
doctrinal questions are formulated. If an expedient answer is sought, the
question is apt to be superficially framed. The seemingly clean, clear,
and straightforward explanations of copyright laws provided by a
treatise such as Nimmer positively reinforce the framing of issues into
69. See, e.g., Leonard Cassuto, Big Trouble in the World of "Big Physics, " SALON.COM, Sept. 16, 2002, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/09/16/physics/index.html.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Two Studies, Two Results, and a Debate Over a Drug, N.Y. TtMES,June 3, 2004,
atCl.
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treatise-compatible queries. Treatise formulas can be methodically
adopted and applied to otherwise perplexing controversies, offering an
irresistible shortcut through the prickly thicket of conflicting case law
and exigent statutory interpretation. The hard slogging of distilling
coherent principles and ascertaining socially beneficial outcomes is
avoided, effectively outsourced to treatise authors.
One cannot vociferously criticize members of the judiciary for (some
would say prudently) utilizing an apparently well-researched, very
lengthy, and comprehensive treatise that is widely regarded as authorita-
tive in the subject area. Given the range of diverse legal issues a federal
judge must be familiar with, referencing a treatise for assistance in
mastering a body of law as complicated as copyright is both reasonable
and understandable. However, such pervasive use can also be insidious,
not in the sense that a treatise author or publisher intends any malfea-
sance, but because dependence that approaches rote reliance transforms
suggested normative interpretations into law and policy without ade-
quate deliberation or consideration of countervailing views.
B. Discouraging Debate and Democracy
The legitimacy of a body of law such as copyright may be evaluated
from substantive, procedural, and social policy perspectives. Substantive
legitimacy concerns the fairness of the explicated laws themselves.
Congress is charged with promulgating laws such as the Copyright Act,
and the federal courts bear primary responsibility for interpreting and
applying them. The Nimmer treatise is not written with the purpose of
critiquing copyright legislation or court-made law, but it is suffused with
Nimmer's positivist visions of equity and justice in the copyright context.
A competing treatise by Paul Goldstein has also correctly been deemed,
"animated and unified by an explicit normative structure."72 To the
extent treatise revelation goes unchallenged by competing evaluation
and analysis in the policy-making context, any natural evolution toward
alternative permutations of substantive fairness is impeded.73 Though
72. Gordon, supra note 43, at 1010.
73. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 4, at 655-56:
There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may not be of a good
quality; but when they all come together it is possible that they may surpass-collectively
and as a body, although not individually-the quality of the few best. Feasts to which many
contribute may excel those provided at one man's expense. In the same way, when there
are many [who contribute to the process of deliberation], each can bring his share of
goodness and moral prudence; and when all meet together the people may thus become
something in the nature of a single person, who--as he has many feet, many hands, and
many senses may also have many qualities of character and intelligence. This is the reason
598 UNIVERSITY OF CIVCINNATI L4W REVIEW [Vol.73
the principles expostulated by treatises may lead to substantively just
outcomes, 74 the substance itself is deficient in form and function because
it is created outside what one might term the democratic evolution of
law.
Procedural legitimacy embodies a concern with how laws are made.
Congress decides how to protect, ignore, or burden the broad range of
interests articulated by various interest groups, stakeholders, and com-
mentators when drafting copyright laws. 75 Courts subsequently generate
the "common law" of copyright through statutory interpretation and
gap filling in the context of balancing the interests of the parties to a
particular dispute, which provides a much more limited universe of con-
cerns and claims from which to craft copyright law.
76
Some observers have expressed grave concerns that congressional
copyright lawmaking has been characterized by the limited participation
of certain stakeholders. 77  The absence of full participation and
why the Many are also betterjudges [than the few] of music and the writings of poets: some
appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all.
(quoting THE POLITICS OFARISTOTLE 141 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford 1958)).
74. They may also lead to bad outcomes, as is discussed below.
75. See, e.g., Wraldron, supra note 4, at 655-56. Waldron states:
What lies behind this is the idea that a number of individuals may bring a diversity of
perspectives to bear on issues under consideration, and that they are capable ofpooling these
perspectives to come up with better decisions than any one of them could make on his own.
That, after all, is why Aristotle took it as the mark of man's political nature that he was
endowed with the faculty of speech. Each can communicate to another experiences and
insights that complement, complicate or qualify those that the other already possesses; and
when this happens in the deliberations of an assembly, it enables the group as a whole to
attain a degree of practical knowledge that surpasses even the coherently applied expertise
of the one excellent legislator.
We may or may not buy Aristotle's view that the many can in this way come up with
better results than the one. But the existence of diverse perspectives in the community and
the helpfulness of bringing them to bear on proposed laws are surely important features in
any account of why the task of legislating is entrusted to assemblies. I believe that these
features in turn frame the way in which we should think about the deliberative process itself,
and in particular how we should regard the relatively high level of formality associated with
debate and action in a legislative assembly.
Id. (citations omitted).
76. Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure oJt1he Common Law, 75 WASH.
U L.Q. 1 1 13-14 (1997):
The entire framework of the UCC is based on common law. While it is obviously a statute,
and may even claim to he a code, it relies heavily upon the common-law models. Sometimes
it follows these models slavishly, and sometimes it modifies them creatively, but common law
has remained at the foundation of the vast majority of the Code's provisions. As a result, the
Code inherits the common law's blindness to consumer concerns, the very blindness which
led directly to the law reform efforts of the consumer movement.
77. E.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES: A
TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY 9 (2003):
But there is every reason to doubt that policy makers have ever been able to shape and
reshape such powerful economic rights in a dispassionate, informed and objective manner
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deliberative decisionmaking is an unacceptable means of developing
copyright policies in a society comprised of diverse financial concerns,
distributional interests, and cultural values. Elevation by Congress of
the goals and mores of a few privileged interest groups above all others
imperils the integrity of the entire copyright system. To the extent that
the Nimmer treatise, or any other, is used by policymakers to a degree
or in a manner that excludes alternative views-clearly the fault of those
who use the treatise as a template or bible rather than the treatise
itself-the procedural legitimacy of copyright law is undermined.
Courts that rely exclusively, or even primarily, on a copyright treatise
as a prepackaged, comprehensible exposition of the common law of
copyright will exclude alternative normative and interpretive views of
copyright law, perhaps not even recognizing that contrary positions
exist. Judges who engage in wholesale, unquestioning adoption of any
single source of pre-synthesized copyright law, failing to draw on com-
peting theories, will perform ostensibly independent analyses in applica-
tion of law to fact with hidden and unrecognized but potentially tremen-
dous biases. In the absence of countervailing resources of similar
stature, the very existence of a hegemonic treatise potentially prevents
the evenly matched battles of policy and doctrine necessary for the
emergence ofjust outcomes.78
even when they have wanted to. After all, the full economic effects of a particular IP
structure are difficult if not impossible to predict, and powerful economic actors are bound
to take a keen interest in the decisions of these policy makers when there is so much at stake,
and to seek to influence change. In addition, the complex and technical nature of IP
regulation means that policy makers must depend on outside experts. These are likely to he
practitioners with their own agendas and biases.
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legilative Histoy, supra note 5; Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological
Change, supra note 5, at 353-54; Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right o Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
29, 37-52 (1994); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY LJ. 965, 977-92 (1990).
78. Cf Richard A. Matasar, Practice and Procedure: Treatise Writing and Federal Jurisdiction Scholarship. Does
Doctrine Matter 14hen Law is Politics?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1515 (1991):
First, even those of us who think law is politics in the Supreme Court acknowledge that the
lower courts act as if they are constrained by doctrine. Thus, lower court judges faithfully
peruse precedent, try to reconcile irreconcilable cases, look hard at history, and weigh
competing policy concerns. For them, a treatise is extraordinarily valuable. It collects in one
place relevant legal materials and it summarizes the range of arguments about disputed
questions. In so doing, treatises save an enormous amount of time and guide courts' analyses.
Second, some questions, even in federal jurisdiction cases, have easy,
noncontroversial answers. Yet, because an area of law is so vast that the typical lawyer,
student, or judge can only know a slight portion of the law, treatises are vital to pulling
together the grist of applicable legal principles. Having a source that sets forth what is not
controversial is often far more important to the daily functioning of law than a source
addressed only to those once-in-a-lifetime disputes that work their way the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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Concerns about social or empirical legitimacy pertain to the broad
acceptance of a particular view of copyright law by the body politic.
Based on its ubiquity, ]Vmmer on Copyright is perceived as having a degree
of social and empirical legitimacy far beyond which any treatise, no
matter how thorough, ought to be accorded. The result of investing a
treatise with unwarranted social or empirical legitimacy is that the work
can then have an inordinate impact on legislators, court decisions, and
the ultimate evolution of copyright law. The rule of Nimmer can easily
be mistaken for the rule of law.
C. Subsuyface Social Norms
Copyright legislation and jurisprudence are comprised of, and
affected by, an evolving set of social norms. One important premise of
Robert Ellickson's theories about the intersection between social norms
and customs and formal law is the pervasiveness of "legal centralism."79
Ellickson defines legal centralism as the view that "the state functions as
the sole creator of operative rules of entitlement among individuals."'
In an area of the law as complicated and sometimes contradictory as
copyright law, government-in the form of statutory authority and case
law-may be inaccurately viewed as the true source of copyright law,
while the Nimmer treatise is mistakenly perceived as simply a primer on,
guidebook to, or shorthand version of the evolving copyright law at
large.
Whether treatise-driven and treatise-dependent attitudes existed prior
to widespread adoption of the Nimmer treatise in particular, or evolved
out of the precise practice of relying on the Nimmer treatise, the extra-
ordinary level of reliance suggests that the normative belief that
adhering to the teachings of the Nimmer treatise is a mode of conduct
that ought to be followed. Without this normative belief, use of the
treatise would be a lesser indulged habit or convenience, but the treatise
could not influence or create "the law" to the extent it does. Judges,
lawyers, congressional representatives, and even legal scholars who have
internalized "Nimmer norms" exhibit convictions that this standard of
behavior is obligatory, giving the customary copyright law promulgated
by the Nimmer treatise profound power and authority. Widespread
citation practices create and reinforce expectations that the Nimmer
79. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4 (1991)
(questioning legal centralism is one of the central purposes of this book).
80. Id
600
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treatise should be cited, rendering certain views about particularized
copyright doctrines normalized, and others deviant.
The intention of this Article is not to challenge the entire contents of
the Nimmer treatise per se, or to question or impugn the motives of its
energetic and successful authors and publishers. The work's popularity
and widespread usage attest to its usefulness and worth. The concern
raised here is that the Nimmer treatise is widely treated by lawyers and
judges as though it is a neutral, impartial exposition of copyright law.
It is not. To paraphrase literary theorist Stanley Fish, the objectivity of
the treatise is an illusion, and a dangerous illusion because it is so
physically convincing.8
Melville Nimmer was a very prolific legal scholar who generally advo-
cated strong copyright protections and expansive copyright policies.
8 2
81. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 43 (1980) ("The objectivity of the text is an illusion and, moreover, a dangerous illusion,
because it is so physically convincing.").
82. In Termination of Transfers Under the Copyrig&Act of1976, Melville B. Nimmer argued for a "second
chance" for copyright holders who were in a poor bargaining position when initially negotiating the sale
of their copyright. 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947, 949-50 (1977) ("frequently [authors] are so sorely pressed for
funds that they are willing to sell their work for a mere pittance" (quoting Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M.
Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943))); see also MELVILLE NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION: INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY (3d ed. 1985); MELVILLE NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LAW PERTAINING TO LITERARY, MUsICAL AND ARTISTIC WORKS
(1971 & Supps. 1971, 1974 & 1977); MELVILLE NIMMER, COPYRIGHTAND RELATEDTOPICS: ACHOICE
OF ARTICLES (1964) (A collection of previously published articles.); MELVILLE NIMMER, FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (CONTU)
(1978); 1-10 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13; MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY AND THE PROTECTION OF
IDEAS (1963 & Supps. 1964-1976); MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OFSPEECH: A TREATISE
ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984); MELVILLE NIMMER, SYLLABUS FOR A COURSE ON
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (LA., UCLA School of Law, 1977); MELVILLE NIMMER, SYLLABUS ON
FUNDAMENTALS OF COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER (Berkeley, Cal.,
Continuing Education of the Bar, 1964); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & MONROE E. PRICE, MORAL RIGHTS
AND BEYOND: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION (1976), reprinted in MONROE E.
PRICE, RESUSCITATING A COLLABORATION WITH MELVILLE NINMER: MORAL RIGHTS AND BEYOND
9 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Seh. of Law, Yeshiva Univ., Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property No. 3,
n.d.), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/acadenic-prog/ip-program/additional.asp; Melville B.
Nimmer, Comment on the Douglas Dissent in Lee v. Runge, 19 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 68 (1971);
Melville B. Nimmer, The Constitutionality ofOffuial Censorship ofMotien Pictures, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (1958);
Melville Nimmer, Copyright 1955,43 CAL. L. REV. 791 (1955); Melvillc B. Nimmer, Copyright 1956 Recent
Trends in the Law sfArtistic Propeny, 4 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1957); Melville Nimmer, Copyright andInstructional
Materials, in ASS'N OF AM. MEDICAL COLLS. & NAT'L LIBRARY FOR MED., EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
FOR MEDICINE: ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT (1972); Melville B. Nimmer,
Copyright and Qxasi-Copyright Protecton for Characters, Tts and Phonogrph Records, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 63
(1969); Melville Bernard Nimmer, Copyright Law, in ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 75
(Leonard D. Duboffed., 1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Copyighg LiabilioyforAudio Home Recordin& Dispelling the
Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1982); Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
185 (1956); Melville Nimmer, Copyright USA, in 4 GROVE'S DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 744
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His son David, who has been editing Aimmer on Copyright since -1985,3
also has his own distinctly normative points of view about various
aspects of copyright law,84 which some courts wholeheartedly
(S. Sadie ed., MacMillan-Publishers 6th ed. 1980); Melville Nimmer, Copyright vs. The First Amendment, 17
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'" U.S.A. 255 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees ofFree Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L REx'. 1180 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Foreword: Tim
Copyright Crises, 15 UCLA L REV. 931 (1968); Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of
the Berne Convention and the United States Copyight Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1967); Melville B. Nimmer,
Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARV. L. REx'. 1125 (1951); (criticizing weak copyright policies and stating
that "in trying to draw the line of infringement beyond the reach of unworthy claimants, the courts run
the risk that they will thereby deny relief to those who have in fact been deprived of the fruits of their
literary labor"); Melville Nimmer, Introduction, in LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE ARTIST: A SERIES OF
STUDIES SUBMITrED TO THE NATIONAL ENDOWM, tENTr FOR THE ARTS I (Melville B. Nimmer ed., 1968);
Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction--is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: 14,hat Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, An Introduction to Copyright, 36 L.A. B. Bt t.l.. 90 (1961);
Melville B. Nimmer, The Law ofideas, 27 S. CALL RLV. 119 (1954); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of
Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1973); Melville B. Nimmcr, National Security
Secrets v. Free Speech: The Ismes l ef Undeided in the Ellsherg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1974); Melville B.
Nimmer, The Nature ofthe Rights Protected by Copyright, 10 UCLA L. REV. 60 (1962); Melville B. Nimmer,
Photocopying and Record Piracy: OfDred &ott andAlice in Wonderland, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1052 (1975); Melville
Nimmer, The Plate ofArgentina in the World Copyright Communi!y, REVISTAJURiDICA DE BUENOS AIRES (No.
1-111-1957); Melville B. Nimmer, Preface--The Old Copyright Act as a Part of the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 471(1977); Melville B. Nimmer, A Proposalfor Judicial Validation ofa Previously Unconstitutional Law: The
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1394 (1965); Melville B. Nimmer, Proprietary Rights, Residual
Rights and Copyrght in Cartridge TV in the Umted States and Canada, 3 PERF. ARTS REx'. 3 (1972); Melville B.
Nimmer, Recapture ofCopyrightfiomn tlheMexican Public Domain, II BULL. COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 408 (1964);
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publiciy, 19 LAiW & CoNTEmP. PROBS. 203 (1954); Melville Nimmer, The
Right aj Publicity, in LANDMARKS OF LAiv 284 (Ray D. Henson ed., 1960); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right
to Speaklfom Times to Time: First Amendment Theoq , Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV.
935 (1968); Melville B. Nimmer, Rights and Limitations on Copyright from Others in the Production ofAudio- Visual
Materials, 9 C. BIBLIOCENTRE NEWSL. 2 (Ontario, Canada 1973); Melville B. Nimmer, Significant Copyright
Decisions and Legislation of the Past rear, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHTSOC'Y U.S.A. 442 (1962); Melville B. Nimmer,
Speech and Press: A BriefReply, 23 UCLA L. REV. 120 (1975); Melville Nimmer, Television, in 4 WORLD
COPYRIGHT: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 462 (H. L. Pinner ed., 1953-1960); Melville B. Nimmer, Termination of
Transfers Under the CopyrightAct ofl976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1977); Melville B. Nimmer, The United States
Copyright Law and te Berne Convention: The Implications of the Prospective Revision ofEach, 2 COPYRIGHT 94 (1966);
Melville Nimmer, Ie Droit d'Auteur aur Etats-Unis Face a Ia Convention de Berne: Ios hplications Contenues dans leur
Projects de Revision Respectifi, 79 LE DROIT D'AUTEUR 499 (1967) (a French translation of the above item);
Melville B. Nimmer, The Uses'ofJudiial Review in Israels Quest for a Constitution, 70 COLUx. L. REV. 1217
(1970); Melville Nimmer, lho is the Copyright Ouer Il7Phen Laws Conflict?, in FESTSCHRfI-I FCR EUGEN
ULMER (1973); Melville B. Nimmcr, Studies on Copyright, 51 A.B.A. J. 1078 (1965) (book review) (Arthur
Fisher Memorial Edition).
83. Irell & Manella, Attorney Bio: David Nimmer, at http://www.irell.com/attorne)s/
ShowLawyer.asp?AID= 118.
84. See, e.g., DAVIDNIMMERETAL.,PRE-EXISTINGCON'USION INCOPYRIGHT'SWORK-FOR-HIRE
DOCTRINE (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law & Legal Research Theory Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 109, 2002), cailable at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=359720;
Paul Marcus & David Nimmer, Forum on Attorne's Fees in Copyright Cases: Are 4e Running 7hrough the Jungle
Now or Is the Old Man Still Stuck Down the Road?, 39 WM. & MARY L. RE\V. 65 (1997), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 1507; David Nimmer, Adams and Bits. OfJewish
K'ings and Copyrights, 71 S. CAL L. REV. 219 (1998); David Nimmer, Appreciating Lgistatiupe Histofy: The Sweel
and Sour Spots ofthe DMCA's Conuentag, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 909 (2002); David Nimmer, Aus Der enen
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embrace." David Nimmer is arguably not as consistently an advocate
of "high protectionist" copyright policies as his father was.86 However,
on at least two occasions he explicitly concluded that "Father knows
best,"87 apparently endorsing the Supreme Court's very high barrier
holding in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises in the first,"8
and defending his father's position on the National Commission on New
Welt, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 195 (1998); David Nimmer, Back From the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital
Millennium Copright Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. UJ. 855 (2001); David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia
of the DigitalAge, 10 HARV.J.L & TECH. 1 (1996); Ninimer, supra note 29; David Nimmer, Copyright in the
Dead Sea Scrolls; Authorship and Onginaliy, 38 Hous. L REV. 1 (2001); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by
the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L. REV. 383 (1988); David Nimmer, The End of Copyright,
48 VANf. I. REV'. 1385 (1995); Nimmer, supra note 32; David Nimmer, GATS's Entertainment Before and
AAFI2A, 15 LoY. LA. ENT. Lj. 133 (1995); David Nimmer, Ignmi'ng the Public, Parti On theAbsurd Compleri
of the DiWtl Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA F,\. L REV. 189 (2000); David Nimmer et al., The
Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999); David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against
Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Passing /1), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2004); David
Niimmer, An Odyssey Through Copyright'v ftcarious Dejfnses, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV'. 162 (1998); David Nimmer,
Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 46J. COPVRIGHTSOC'Y U.S. 401 (1999); David Nimmer, A Riff
on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000) [hereinafter Nimmer, A Riff
on Fair Use]; David Niuner ct al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similariy of Computer Software
in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 625 (1988); David Nimmer, A Tale of Two Treaties, 22
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS I (1997); David Nimmer, Time and Space, 38 IDEA 501 (1998).
85. A brochure published and circulated by The Center For Intellectual Property Law & Information
Technology of the DePaul University College of Law, which announced that David Nimmer would present
that institution's Nim Scavone Hailer & Niro Distinguished Intellectual Property Lecture, reported:
Aimmer on Copyrights is routinely cited by U.S. and foreign courts at all levels in copyright
litigation, and the courts have relied on many of his law review articles. In 1999, the
Eleventh Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of GAT'-inspired amendments to the
Copyright Act by relying on "The End of Copyright," 48 Vand. L Rev. 1385 (1995). In
1992, the Second Circuit adopted wholesale the test for copyright infringement of computer
software proposed in "A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of
Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases," 20 Ariz. St. LJ. 625 (1988).
17 U.S.C.A. § 203 annot. (West Supp. 2004) lists David Nimmcr, Abend's Stepchild, 43J. COPYRIGHT
SOc'Y 139 (1995) among pertinent Law Review Commentaries.
86. See, e.g., Nimmer, A Ri fon Fair Use, supra note 84, at 739-40 (2000):
The lengthy analysis of how section 1201 works in practice leads to the conclusion that its
entire edifice of user exemptions is of doubtful puissance. The user safeguards so proudly
heralded as securing balance between owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to
achieve their stated goals. If the courts apply section 1201 as written, the only users whose
interests are truly safeguarded are those few who personally posses% sufficient expertise to
counteract whatever technological measures are placed in their path.
This defect is not a small one. Many legislators characterized the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act as "probably one of the most important bills that we have passed this
Congress." The fair use issue constitutes "one of the most important provisions of this
legislation." Accordingly, it is a source of disappointment to be forced to disagree with the
conclusion that Congress "mastered the intricate details of this complex subject and has
produced a balanced result."
87. Nimmer, supra note 29, at 1266; Nimmer, supra note 32, at 287.
88. Nimmer, supra note 29, at 1266; Nimmer, supra note 32, at 287.
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Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in the second.89
Additionally, he appears to have financial as well as personal motives
not to change- the high protectionist content of the treatise very much,
given that he has written:
Later to grow to four volumes during his lifetime, Ximmer on Copyright
became the gold standard that courts recognize as "the most authori-
tative treatise on copyright," "renowned," "eminent," "classic," "fore-
most," and "leading"-even "the great copyright treatise."
During the last fifteen years of the pendency of the 1909 [Copy-
right] Act and through the first dozen years after the 1976 Act took
effect, that treatise stood alone as a comprehensive analysis of all U.S.
copyright law. It therefore reached the status of a summa, which courts
cited not merely for its convenient encapsulization of the holdings of
disparate prior cases, but also for its own authorial pronouncements.
The result is that Mel Nimmer became, notwithstanding his own
private tendencies, an ersatz lawmaker promulgating copyright
doctrine. But unlike any governmental official, he placed his stamp
not simply on the few selected matters that came to him for decision,
but across the alpha and omega of copyright doctrine-so much so
that a recent case in Chicago referred to "Professor Nimmer's treatise,
cited ubiquitously as authority in copyright cases."
Considerjust a few instantiations. (1) The great metaphysical ques-
tion in all of copyright law is where the line must be drawn beyond
which appropriation becomes "substantial similarity," and hence
actionable conduct. Prior to 1963, courts used that term in a bewil-
dering plethora of senses. When the treatise came onto the scene,
however, Professor Nimmer separated those applications into their
appropriate pigeonholes throughout the law of copyright, some
belonging to other realms (such as fair use) and others limning the
contours of how much copying is required for liability. As to those, he
further divided them into a dichotomy of his own invention, which he
dubbed "comprehensive nonliteral similarity" and "fragmented literal
similarity." As he recognized at the time, "[t]his distinction has
received almost no express judicial recognition." Yet his own analysis
set the standard, as courts began to adopt the treatise formulation. At
present, dozens of cases have adopted this treatise terminology,
making it as firmly rooted in copyright doctrine as most pronounce-
ments by Congress in Title 17 of the United States Code.
It is the rare case indeed that strays from that framework. Indeed,
only two examples come to mind-and their lesson is that courts
abandon the Nimmer framework at their peril.'
89. Nimmer, supra note 29, at 1266-67.
90. Id at 1240-42 (footnotes omitted).
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Well into his second decade as the treatise's marquee editor, David
Nimmer is the public face of .Nimmer on Copyright, and he frequently gives
lectures on copyright topics domestically and around the world.9
Courts seem to blur Nimmer the treatise with Nimmer the person, as
evidenced by a marked tendency to preface analysis from the treatise
with phrases such as, "Professor Nimmer explains" or "Professor
Nimmer suggests."9 It has been anecdotally reported93 that when they
91. Attorney Bio: David Nimmer, supra note 83.
Mr. Nimmer lectures widely in the copyright arena. Besides in-house seminars (such as for
the legal staffs of Turner Broadcasting in Atlanta and Times Mirror in New York and Los
Angeles), he has lectured around the world - at MLIA in Cannes, ALAI in Tel Aviv,
LUISS in Rome, IMPRIMATUR in London, and the Copyright Society ofJapan in Tokyo,
and regularly to bar organizations in California and throughout the U.S.
See also LexisNexis Bookstore, ]immer on Copyght: About the Author, at http://bookstore.lexis.com/
bookstore/catalog?action =author&authorpk=28 1:
David Nimmer is Of Counsel to Ireil & Manella in Los Angeles, California. Since 1985, he
has assumed responsibilities from his father, the late Professor Melville B. Nimmer of UCLA
Law School, for updating and revising .tmumer on Copyright, t e standard reference treatise in
the field, routinely cited by U.S. and foreign courts at all levels in copyright litigation. Apart
from his treatise, Mr. Nimmer authors numerous law review articles on domestic and
international copyright issues.
Mr. Nimmer also lectures widely in the copyright area. He has delivered a
number of lectures concerning multimedia: at MILIA in Cannes, at Digital World in Los
Angeles, and at seminars for the in-house legal staffs of Turner Broadcasting System in
Atlanta and Times Mirror in New York and Los Angeles.
In addition to writing and lecturing, Mr. Nimmer represents clients in the
entertainment, publishing, and high technology fields. He gave Congressional testimony on
behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters in 1992, and Parliamentary testimony on
behalf of the Combined Newspaper and Magazine Copyright Committee of Australia in
Sydney in 1993.
8th Annual Summer IPL Summer Conference, at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/cle-schedule.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2005); The Commodification of Information, at http://law.haifa.ac.il/events/event_sites/
info-comm/nimmer.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); Conference on the Public Domain, at http://www.law.
duke.edu/pd/about.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); The Impact of Article 2B, at http://www.law.berkeley
.edu/institutes/bclt/events/ucc2b/index.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); International Intellectual Property
Symposium, at http://www.cni.org/Hforums/cni-copyright/2000-01/0571.html (created Apr. 3, 2000);
News from the McCarthy Institute, at http://www.usfca.edu/law/mccarthy/mc-news.htnl (last visited Feb.
8, 2005); Southwestern National Entertainment and Media Law Institute Events, at http://
www.swlaw.edu/entertainment/events.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
92. See e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996);
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991); Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d
1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981); Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 483 (9th Cir. 1978); Do It Best Corp. v. Pass-
port Software, Inc., No. 01 C 7674, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14174 (N.D. ID. July 23, 2004); Milne v.
Stephen Slesinger, Inc., No. CV 02-08508 FMC (PLAx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7942 (C.D. Cal. May 8,
2003); CBS Broad., Inc. v. ABC, No. 02 Civ. 8813 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258 (S.D.N.Y.Jan.
13, 2003); Williams v. Broadus, No. 99 Civ. 10957 (MBM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12894 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
24, 2001); Selznick v. Turner Entm't Co., 990 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Jon Woods
Fashions, Inc. v. Curran, No. 85 Civ. 3203 (MJL), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3319 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1988);
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Associated Film Distribution
Corp. v. Thornburgh, 614 F. Supp. 1100, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Swarovski Am., Ltd. v. Silver Deer, Ltd.,
537 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (D. Colo. 1982). A search on Westlaw composed of "Professor /3 Nimmer"
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encounter him at professional conferences and gatherings, federal judges
treat David Nimmer like a celebrity, nervously mentioning copyright
opinions they have recently authored, and then deferentially asking
"Did I get it right?" One would expect such questions to be asked the
other way around, with Nimmer inquiring whether he had correctly
reported the judges' opinions in his treatise, since judges make the law
and the treatise ostensibly simply reports it. No matter how highly
knowledgeable, a treatise author should not be perceived as the nation's
primary authority on copyright law. No one should be. Melville
Nimmer himself recognized this, as evidenced by his words in this
excerpt from a 1983 biographical article published in the National Law
Journal:
That's not to say, however, that being generally regarded as the
nation's foremost authority doesn't have its risks. While Mr. Nimmer
can-and sometimes does-cite himself in briefs, opposing lawyers
can quote his position with equal ease.
"He does trip on the treatise occasionally," said David A. Gerber,
a copyright lawyer with Loeb and Loeb in Los Angeles and a former
student of Mr. Nimmer who has worked on several appeals with him.
"Then someone will ask on oratorical fury, 'Your honor, whom are we
to believe? Nimmer the advocate? Or Nimmer the scholar?'
Mr. Nimmer usually answers such verbal attacks by telling
opponents they do not understand his treatise, then referring them to
sections in his work.
"Or else think of what Wilt Williston is quoted as saying when the
court called his attention to something in his contract treatise," said
Mr. Nimmer, "He answered, 'Your honor, since I wrote that, I've
learned a great deal."'
Nonetheless, Mr. Nimmer bristles at the idea that he would cite his
treatise to support a point of law. He quickly points out that he only
refers to the work as a shorthand abbreviation for a long string of cases
or a complex argument, "I hope I never say that something should be
the law because I say so," he added.9"
turned up 284 instances of these phrases.
93. Reports of this have been orally repeated to this author and those practicing attorneys making
these claims have understandably requested anonymity."
94. Mary Ann Glanate, The Man Who Wrote the Book Melvilk B. Ainmer is King ofCop right, NAT'L LJ.,
Oct. 10, 1983, at 6.
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IV. NORMATIVE ILLUSIONS OF COHERENCE
The goal of any legal treatise is to articulate the empirical state of the
law, and authorship of a treatise is generally not explicitly undertaken
as a normative exercise. The constructive acts of both Congress and the
federal courts provide direction as to what copyright law is, and what
those who desire to comply with various dictates of copyright law are re-
quired to do. However, any advocate or scholar who is informed about
and interested in copyright cannot help but report these empirical
sources of law in a manner that articulates preferred norms. In a
treatise this is accomplished within the structured, objective-seeming for-
mat that may seem necessary to bring something approaching coher-
ence and consistency to a complicated subject area. In fact, at least one
intellectual property law scholar has suggested that exposition of
normative analytical modes is a positive attribute in a treatise, asserting:
The treatise writer's dilemma is that while reliability requires faithful
interpretation of the law as it stands, he or she must also remain suffi-
ciently detached and forward-looking to assist decision-makers in
shaping the law as it ought to be. The better treatise writers resolve
this tension by devising jurisprudential and methodological appro-
aches that broaden the horizons of experienced practitioners in the
field.95
The common law of copyright is a set of rules and norms derived and
distilled from germane judicial opinions, a normative order consisting
of rights and duties abstracted from prior decisions. Repetitive adoption
of treatise expostulations forms a cognizable series of customary legal
obligations that can be invested with close to binding authority by the
relevant community. Attributing the composition and structure of the
treatise to "a thirst for legal order," one observer articulated, "Nimmer's
treatise artfully blended logic, case precedent, and statutory interpreta-
tion into a seemingly coherent body of law that courts and practitioners
found manageable."96 The Nimmer treatise provides a valuable over-
view ofa complicated and at times counterintuitive subject area, but one
with an editorial viewpoint that is largely obscured. Though mainly
purporting to be merely descriptive, it promulgates a particular norma-
tive view of specific copyright law issues, as does any copyright treatise.
This may be unrecognized by decisionmakers, who then fail to weigh
opposing views before rendering conclusions.
95. Jerome H. Reichman, Goldskin on Copyright Law: A Realist's Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN.
L. REx;. 943, 943 (1991).
96. Id. at 944-45.
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Many people who study copyright law develop an overarching philo-
sophy about the proper scope of copyright protections.9 7 A copyright
treatise with a subtle editorial slant toward high, medium, or low copy-
right protectionism could affect development of the law if the treatise
has a causal effect on the outcome of a policy debate or litigation
dispute. Unreflective adherence to the mores of a copyright treatise sub-
verts the formalism required by "the rule of law," 98 and undermines
democratic principles. One articulation of elements of the rule of law
is as follows:
1. Generality. Roughly, there must be rules, cognizable separately
from (and broader than) specific cases, such that the rules can be
applied to specific cases, or specific cases can be seen to fall under or
lie within them.
2. Notice or publicity. Those who are expected to obey the rules must
be able to find out what the rules are.
3. Prospectivity. The rules must exist prior in time to the actions
being judged by them.
4. Clarity. The rules must be understandable by those who are
expected to obey them.
5. Non-contradictoriness. Those who are expected to obey the rules
must not simultaneously be commanded to do both A and not-A.
6. Conformability. The addressees must be able to conform their
behavior to the rules.
7. Stability. The rules must not change so fast that they cannot be
learned and followed.
8. Congruence. The explicitly promulgated rules must correspond
with the rules inferable from patterns of enforcement by functionaries
(e.g., courts and police).99
97. Se, t.g., Bartow, supra note 3, at 38-41 & nn.82-88.
98. RobertS. Summers, The Pina'ples ofthe Ruk ofLaw, 74NOTREDAMEL. REv. 1691, 1701 (1999):
Each principle of the rule of law is affirmatively "formal" in one or more of four ways:
methodologically, procedurally, accommodatively, and authorizationally. Many principles
are methodo/ogically formal. That is, many have to do with the manner or way in which law
is created and brought to bear, with how that very law itself is to take shape, and with what
that shape is. The requirements of rule-like shape, of clarity, and of prospectivity, are
illustrative of such methodological requirements.
99. MargaretJane Radin, Rew0yidedng the Ruk ofLatv, 69 B.U.L. REV. 781,785 (1989). Radin further
notes:
[Alithough not included on Fuller's list, it is clear that there must be a ninth and tenth
requirement: (9) addressees of rules must be rational choosers; (10) addressees must be
suitably motivated, perhaps by penal sanctions, perhaps by opportunities for reward. The
addressees must be such as can respond by following the rules, if the rules have the two
characteristics of know-ability and perform-ability. The addressees must further be such as
will respond, if they are motivated to do so by their desires to obtain rewards or avoid
punishment.
Id at 787; see alsoJames W. Torke, What is This Thing Called the Ruk ofLaw?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1445 (2001).
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Most intellectual property scholars agree that copyright law generally
lacks the first four listed elements: generality, clarity, stability, and
congruence."° At times notice or publicity and conformability are in
doubt as well. 1'0 Copyright laws are inconsistent across media and tech-
nologies,'02 challenging to comprehend, frequently amended, and
difficult to extrapolate across disparate technologies and factual situa-
tions. 1"3 Unless they are (or employ) attorneys, copyright actors are un-
likely to know where to find out what the rules are, and even if they do,
can have ajustifiably hard time conforming to rules they do not under-
stand. When the involved parties are lawyers, lawmakers, or judges,
they are likely to gravitate to a treatise if it appears to fulfill the rulebook
function. The inclination is understandable, but those who submit to
the rule of the treatise conflate it with the rule of law. In a review of a
different treatise on another subject altogether, one legal scholar wrote:
Students "learn" from treatises, lawyers cite them for authority, and
judges use them tojustify their opinions. Even if one believes that these
instrumental uses of treatises are no more than covers for the actual
political motivations of legal actors, one should not dismiss treatises as
unimportant. That treatises are being used to persuade suggests power
in the positions being taken by authors."
A web site maintained by the University of Tennessee's Office of the
General Counsel refers those interested in "sources of information about
copyright" to the Nimmer treatise with the admonition: "The classic
text and very useful for understanding the basic principles. [sic] Not as
useful in the application of the principles to technology."' 5 Perhaps this
is because the Internet poses challenges to content distributors that they
do not trust traditional copyright principles to resolve satisfactorily. One
can assume, however, that all of the copyright treatise authors and
publishers are working on meeting the demand for a normative illusion
of coherent copyright principles in cyberspace. Open, informed debate
is not likely to be part of the development process because treatises are
not compiled or edited by committee.
100. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNcIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 125-29 (2000). Seegenerally Sheldon Halpern, Copyright Law in the DOtdlAge: Maltm
in se and Malun Pmhibitum, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2000).
101. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 125-29. &egeneraly Halpern, supra note
100.
102. For example, compare copyright in sound recordings such as VARA and digital audio tapes with
copyright in musical compositions.
103. See generally Bartow, supra note 3.
104. Matasar, supra note 78, at 1516-17.
105. See University of Tennessee, Office of General Counsel, Copyright Information, at
http://www.lib.utk.edu/-gco/copyright.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
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V. THE NIMMER TREATISE AS A DE FACTO
RESTATEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS
The American Law Institute (ALI) is an organization comprised of
judges, law professors, and attorneys, founded in 1923 with the goal of
bringing "coherence, reason, and consistency" to specific areas of the
common law. Lawyers affiliated with the organization review state
court case law and distill it "into a series of 'black letter' rules, followed
by explanatory 'Comments,' which are, in turn, followed by 'Reporters'
Notes,' which show the case law basis for the rule itself."06
ALI publishes and updates Restatements in various areas of law,
including Agency Law, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Property, Restitu-
tion, Torts, Trusts, and Unfair Competition. °7 Whatever one's view of
the final products, at the very least the ALI Restatements are "vetted"
by a diverse array of scholars in the field. Published criticisms of the
works and their evolutionary progressions are both frequent and freely
accessible. The editorial processes are far more democratic and trans-
parent than is treatise drafting.
Like treatises, Restatements can be credited with too much authority.
As one legal scholar admonishes:
It is important to remember that no restatement is ever "law." It has
no legal force. It is, in theory, an educated analysis of what past
judicial decisions or legislation say the law ought to be. This is parti-
cularly true in an area in which the common law method still functions
as the principal guide to decisionmakers. A restatement never becomes
law. It can never be anything more than a guide because, whatever
the expertise, acumen, brilliance, or dedication of those who draft a
restatement, they carry no authority to decide what the law is in a con-
troversy between parties. Restaters are not authoritative decision-
makers. If the words and policies of the restatement become law, they
do so because authoritative lawmakers adopt them, not because they
receive the affirmative vote of the ALI.'08
When teaching courses to law students, one notices that some of
them, particularly first-year law students, can cling to Restatements as
irrefutable statements of the law, a resource that provides something
approximating certainty in a frightening sea of ambiguity. The author
106. Victor E. Schwartz, The Restataent ('Third) of Torts: Products Liabilipv- The American law Institute's
Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFSTLRA L. RE, v. 743, 743 (1998).
107. See, e.g., The American Law lnstitute's Rcstatcmcnt of the Law 2002 Checklist, at
http://www.ali.org/ali/checklist-.ali.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
108. Harold G. Maier, The Utilitarian Role of a Restatement of Conflicts in a Common Law Systeen: Hlow Much
Judicial Deference is Due to the Restateo or "Who are these guys, anywa?" 75 IND. L. 541,548(2000).
610
2004] HEGEMONY OF THE COPYRIGHT TREATISE 611
has observed this while teaching Property and is informed by colleagues
that similar phenomena occur in Contracts and Torts. These students
often obstinately believe that any judge that disagrees with a Restate-
ment has written an opinion that is "wrong."
One way to combat unholy Restatement respect and reliance is to
explain the Restatement drafting process to students as something akin
to reaching a resolution short of trial in a litigated dispute: The
hallmark feature of a fair and optimal settlement is that every party is a
little unhappy with the negotiated result. One recent example of the
controversy and compromises embedded in Restatement drafting is
aptly communicated by the tone and content of the scholarly works
published in Volume 54 of the Vanderbilt Law Review, which in April 2001
published an entire symposium issue of scholarly articles which sharply
critiqued the Restatement (Third) of Torts on a range of issues, and from a
variety of angles. Contrast this with the comparatively anemic critical
inspection treatises receive by way of occasional book reviews and
critical but self-serving policing by competitors.
In addition to being the subject of three iterations of ALI's Restate-
ment of Torts, tort law is the subject of several treatises, including the
very influential Prosser on Torts. '09 Although ALI Restatements have no
force of law on their own, they have had a substantial impact on the
development of the common law and, one would expect, on related
treatises, which are free to embrace or reject Restatement teachings.
Courts are empirically far more likely to cite to the Restatement than to
any tort law treatise." ' .Though tort law treatises are cited with great
frequency, the viewpoints they espouse can at least be evaluated against
those in the Restatement, as well as those proffered by competing
treatises.
A. Competing Copyright Treatises are Ineffectual at
Offering Diverse Vews
The legal profession is curiously riddled with longstanding practices
that are inefficient but difficult to dislodge. Consider the Uniform
System of Citations."' Accepted as the standard for legal citations, its
109. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984) (edited
by my University of South Carolina School of Law colleague David Owen).
110. For example, a LexisNexis search performed onJanuary 12, 2005 suggested that sinceJan. 1,
2003, the Restatement on Torts has been cited 2,999 times in federal and state case law while Prosser on
Torts was cited 881 times in the same database during the same interval.
111. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CrfATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds.,
17th ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE BLUEBOOK].
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dictates are largely unquestioned,' 12 but similarly they are often ponder-
ous and unjustified. Why, for example, do lawyers waste words by
adding the words "cert. denied" to federal case citations? Considering
how few cases the Supreme Court hears each year,113 one could
112. But see Melissa H. Weresh, Book Review, 7he ALWD Citation ManuaL A Truly Uniform System of
Citation, 6 LEGAL WRITING 257 (2000); Janes.W. Paulsen, An Uninformed System of Citation, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1780 (1992) (book review); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N.,JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING MANUAL 65 (1991);
Floyd Abrams, A Wortdy Traditin: The Scholar and the First Amendment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1162, 1162 n. II
(1990) ("As everyone knows--with the glaring exception of law review editors-it is the First Amendment,
not the first amendment. Those who believe in the freedom of speech should begin by rejecting the tyranny
of the Unforn System of Citation." (quoting M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM ON SPEECH vii (1984)));
Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1343 (1986).
113. See The Supreme Court of the United States, About the Supreme Court: TheJustices' Caseload,
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/usticecaseload.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2005):
The Court' s caseload has increased steadily to a current total of more than 7,000 cases on
the docket per Term. The increase has been rapid in recent years. In 1960, only 2,313cases
were on the docket, and in 1945, only 1,460. Plenary review, with oral arguments by
attorneys, is granted in about 100 cases per Term. Formal written opinions are delivered in
80-90 cases. Approximately 50-60 additional cases are disposed ofwithout granting plenary
review. The publication of a Term' s written opinions, including concurring opinions,
dissenting opinions, and orders, approaches 5,000 pages. Some opinions are revised a dozen
or more times before they are announced.
See also The Supreme Court of the United States, Public Information: ChiefJustice's Year-End Reports on
the Federal Judiciary: 2002 Year-End Report, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/year-endreports.html (last updatedJan. 2, 2004):
The total number of case filings in the Supreme Court increased from 7,852 in the 2000
Term to 7,924 in the 2001 Term - an increase of 1%. Filings in the Court's in forma
pauperis docket increased from 5,897 to 6,037 -- a 2.4% rise. The Court's paid docket
decreased by 68 cases, from 1,954 to 1,886 -- a 3.5% decline. During the 2001 Term, 88
cases were argued and 85 were disposed of in 76 signed opinions, compared to 86 cases
argued and 83 disposed of in 77 signed opinions in the 2000 Term. No cases from the 2001
Term were scheduled for re-argument in the 2002 Term.
The Supreme Court of the United States, Public Information: ChiefJustice's Year-End Reports on the
FederalJudiciary: 2001 Year-End Report, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-
endreports.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2004):
The total number of case filings in the Supreme Court increased from 7,377 in the 1999
Tern to 7,852 in the 2000 Term -- an increase of 6.4%. Filings in the Court's infirma
paupeis docket increased from 5,282 to 5,897 - an 11.6% rise. The Court's paid docket
decreased by 138 cases, from 2,092 to 1,954 - a 6.6% decline. During the 2000 Term, 86
cases were argued and 83 were disposed of in 77 signed opinions, compared to 83 cases
argued and 79 disposed of in 74 signed opinions in the 1999 Term. No cases from the 2000
Term were scheduled for re-argument in the 2001 Term. Although the dosing of our
building did not delay any scheduled arguments, the interruption in mail delivery in the
Washington area may have an impact on the number of cases heard by the Court this Term.
The Supreme Court of the United States, Public Information: ChiefJustice's Year-End Reports on the
FederalJudiciary: 2000 Year-End Report, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publidnfo/ycar-end/year-
endreports.html:
The total number of case filings in the Supreme Court increased from 7,109 in the 1998
Term to 7,377 in the 1999 Term - an increase of 3.8%. Filings in the Court's infirma pauperis
docket increased from 5,047 to 5,282 - a 4.7% rise. The Court's paid docket increased by
31 cases, from 2,061 to 2,092 - a 1.5% increase. During the 1999 Term, 83 cases were
argued and 79 were disposed of in 74 signed opinions, compared to 90 cases argued and 84
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reasonably assume that in the vast majority of federal cases certiorari
either was denied or never even pursued. Rather than noting the cases
for which certiorari was denied, a time-and-ink saving alternative
custom could be to annotate case citations only when a decision about
certiorari was pending (e.g. "decision on cert. pending"), or a Supreme
Court ruling itself was either expected (e.g. "S. Ct. ruling expected") or
had issued, as is indicated presently. This substitute practice would
represent a complete paradigm shift, because notations would be strictly
reserved for periods of uncertainty or substantive actions, rather than
the absence of them, and more information would be conveyed. Yet it
is unlikely to be adopted, as it contravenes longstanding if inefficient
practice.
Similarly, one wonders why student-run lawjournals adopt the ineffi-
cient practice of rendering law review names in large and small capital
letters, or lawyers tolerate awkward and counterintuitive abbreviations
such as "Publ'g" for "Publishing," "Ref." for "Refining," "Sec." for both
"Section" and "Securities," and "Tchrs." for "Teachers.""' 4 For that
matter, in legal periodical titles, it seems odd and inexplicable that
lengthy city names such as "Syracuse," "Toronto," and "Willamette"
are required to be completely spelled out, but shorter words such as
"Texas" and "Boston" are abbreviated."
5
Intense reliance upon copyright treatises facially seems like a useful
and efficient practice, and so curtailing it seems implausible at best in an
environment in which even obtuse and irrational citation practices are
intractable. And yet, as discussed above, there are substantive areas of
the law that receive regular, thorough scrutiny and assessment when
Restatements are updated. Copyright is simply not one of them. One
commentator who was involved with production of ALI's Restatement
(Third) of Torts asserted that while the respective Reporters may not have
been correct at every turn:
T] he Reporters and the ALI review process were fair, deliberative,
and democratic. Any careful analysis of the project, from beginning to
end, shows this to be true. A review of the ALI processes and proce-
dures, from the inception of restatements of law in 1923 to the latest
Restatement (Third) in 1998, indicates that such an approach was and
always will be the hallmark of The American Law Institute." 6
disposed of in 75 signed opinions in the 1998 Term. No cases from the 1999 Term were
scheduled for re-argument in the 2000 Term.
114. See THF BLUEBOOK, mora note I 1I, at 303 thl. T.6, 337 tbl. T. 14, 349 tbl. T. 17.
115. Id. at318-41 tbl. T.14.
116. Schwartz, supra note 106, at 759.
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In contrast, the process of drafting and updating any given treatise is
unlikely to be either deliberative or democratic. Rather, a treatise
author strives for a clear, coherent, comprehensive and consistent voice.
The treatise primarily referenced here due to its preeminence is called
iimmer on Copyright rather than Reflections and Debates on Copyright for a
reason: It is formulated to provide a clear, concise overview of copy-
rights, rather than to provoke contemplation or present any sort of
learned consensus. Perhaps that is as it should be," 7 but consumers of
the treatise need to understand the limitations of the treatise, parti-
cularly its focus on doctrine over realism and the politics of law. Even
those seeking only unadorned doctrine should be cognizant of the ex
parte choice-of-doctrine decisions that a treatise author has potentially
made. As one intellectual property scholar warned:
When a leading authority pens a treatise, we have the opportunity to
learn not only what that person thinks the state of the law is, but also
what he thinks it should be. The concomitant danger is that the author
might confuse prescription with description, might make errors of
ascription (inadvertently attributing his own views to the courts or to
Congress), or might mar an otherwise sound discussion by advocating
only one side of the issue.
118
Paul Goldstein first published a competing copyright treatise, Copy-
right: Principles, Law and Practice, in 1989. It was reviewed fairly favorably
by two legal scholars," 9 and somewhat less so by one copyright attorney,
who wrote in 1990:
[Goldstein] describes this large body of statutory and case law in a
highly professional manner. In so doing, however, he invites a com-
parison with the long established reference work, VMmmer on Copyright.
As an intellectual property lawyer, my professional library includes
many other books on copyright and computer law, but none has, to
date, been more indispensable than Nimmer. With the rising cost of
legal publications, the practitioner must seriously consider whether a
new treatise is worth purchasing. Goldstein's Copyright attempts to
expound upon a field already dominated by a recognized classic.
117. But see Matasar, supra note 78, at 1517-18:
As authority, treatises are used to make arguments, to do justice and injustice, and to
influence others. For a treatise writer to assert neutrality, when others will use the work in
ways that the writer would find abhorrent, is a forsaking of professional responsibility.
Treatise writers and other legal scholars ought to take the next logical step: they must take
explicit positions on legal issues,justify them under conventional analysis, explore competing
policies, make clear the underlying political or ideological issues involved, and state their own
positions on those issues.
118. Gordon, supra note 43, at 1017.
119. See id; Reichman, supra note 95.
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Only time will tell whether it will replace Nimmer as the reference
work of choice in the field of copyright law.""
Theoretically, these two copyright treatises offer competing analyses
of substantive areas of the law. If both are consulted, jurists would
arguably be forced to choose between the conflicting positions espoused
by them and, one hopes, make an independent assessment of the mean-
ing and requisites of the pertinent statutory authority and previous on-
point case law in the process. However, doctrinal disagreements
between treatises are rarely discussed by the courts. The Goldstein
copyright treatise has been cited by the federal courts roughly 200 times,
but in approximately 130 of these cases, the Nimmer treatise is
referenced as the primary citation and the Goldstein treatise is treated
as both supplemental to, and in accordance with, the statement or
position contained in the Nimmer treatise. In 20 or so other cases the
Nimmer treatise is a "see also" citation following a reference to the
Goldstein treatise, or both treatises are cited for independent but non-
contradictory propositions.
It is not clear that two treatises in agreement are necessarily correct,
or that when two treatises disagree on a matter of doctrine all of the
doctrinal possibilities and interests have been considered. One cannot
leave the task of making sound copyright law to copyright dispute
litigants, because that is neither their responsibility nor reason for going
to trial. While judges ought to refer to competing treatises as one com-
ponent of their deliberations, they should not abdicate decisionmaking
power to either of them.
A third treatise, William F. Patry's Copyright Law and Practice (previous-
ly known as Latman's the Copyright Law) 2' is also available for consulta-
tion, as well as a fourth, Howard B. Abrams's The Law of Copyright,'
122
which has not been updated recendy. A fifth treatise, Boorstn on Copy-
right,123 is accessible to some extent, though it is currently out of print.
There are undoubtedly other treatise contenders as well. 124 Rivalrous
treatise authors do publicly expose perceived weaknesses in their
competitors' products. The editor of the Latman/Patry treatise,
William F. Patry, on occasion has been very critical of the Nimmer
120. G. Gervaise Davis III, Copyprght Pinclpes, Law and Praice, 3 HARV.J. L & TECH. 241, 241-42
(1990) (book review) (citations omitted).
121. WILliAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (1994) (formerly ALAN LATMAN,
LArMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW (William F. Patty ed., 6th ed. 1986)).
122. HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1991).
123. NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 1994).
124. A comparatively pithy single volume contender is MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW (3d ed. 1999).
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treatise. For example, Patry has asserted that the Nimmer treatise led
one federal judge to erroneously base a jurisdictional holding upon the
treatise's incorrect definition and analysis of the concept of "transitory
torts." '25  Nimmer was wrong, Patry argued, but after one court
125. William Patty, Choice of Law and lntenational Copyjght, 48 AM.J. COmp. L 383, 467-69 (2000).
Patry's exact words are:
In cases where under both a conflicts and contributory infringement analysis, the United
States lacks sufficient contacts with either the subject matter or the acts of infringement to
assert jurisdiction, some courts have, nevertheless, been unable to resist the temptation to act
as a world forum for copyright infringement. The first court led astray was London Ftn Prod.,
Ddt v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., which asserted diversityjurisdieion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2) over foreign acts of copyright infringement. In Lndan,Judge Carter adjudicated
alleged infringement by an American corporation in South America of a British corporation's
copyright. The work was in the public domain in the United States. Judge Carter, citing
only the late Professor Nimmer, based jurisdiction on copyright being a "transitory tort."
Unfortunately, Professor Nimmer had not the slightest idea what a "transitory tort" is, an
ignorance that no doubt misled Judge Carter to the [sic] offer the following inconsistent
policy justifications for asserting jurisdiction:
The Court has an obvious interest in securing compliance with this nation's laws by
citizens of foreign nations who have dealings within this jurisdiction. A concern with the
conduct ofAmerican citizens in foreign countries is merely the reciprocal of that interest. An
unwillingness by this Court to hear a complaint against it [sic] own citizens with regard to a
violation of foreign law will engender, it would seem, a similar unwillingness on the part of
a foreign jurisdiction when the question arises concerning a violation of our laws by one of
its citizens who has since left ourjurisdiction.
Taking these sentences apart in turn, the Court's interest in adjudicating copyright
infringements by foreign citizens that occur in the court's district is statutorily provided for
by Congress in tide 17, [sic] U.S.C. Nothing a foreign court could or could not do would
affect that power. Moreover, ifan American infringes a British work in Britain, the British
courts will hear the claim because they too would be doing so pursuant to a domestic statute.
British courts certainly would not decline otherwise proper jurisdiction because a U.S. court
refused to hear a case against an American citizen for infringement that occurred in England.
In London Flm Productions, there was no U.S. copyright violation because the work was in the
public domain here. Should we expect a British court to hear a case brought by a U.S.
citizen involving an alleged infringement of copyright in South America by a British citizen
when the work is in the public domain in England, merely because the bad boy was British?
If so, we would have been sorely disappointed: at the time of the London Film Productions
decision, English courts declined jurisdiction over even British citizens' claims of overseas
infringement.
. Diversity jurisdiction was supposedly justified by copyright infringement being a
"transitory tort." Why is copyright allegedly a transitory tort? Because, Professor Nimmer
declared, copyright is an incorporeal form of property, and therefore "has no situs apart from
the domicile ofits proprietor." Presumably, ifthe proprietor moves, the situs of the property
moves too. But if the proprietor doesn't move, the situs must remain with the proprietor, in
the London Rin Productions suit this meant in England. Under this reasoning a U.S. court
would never have jurisdiction to hear a claim of infringement of a foreign copyright. In any
event, the nature of copyright as an incorporeal property has nothing to do with transitory
causes of action.
The history behind the local versus transitory distinction is an ancient one in Great
Britain, the origins of which are thoroughly traced in Pearce c. OveArup Partnership Litd The
distinction was originally drawn in order to determine whether a case should be brought in
the county where the event occurred. Jurisdiction was mandatory in that county when the
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followed the unsound teachings of the treatise, a number of subsequent
courts did likewise, "citing [the first flawed opinion] for the transitory
tort proposition as if that decision was based on a firm foundation."' 6
According to Patry, not only were federal courts led astray, but also the
author of a competing copyrights treatise as well. In a footnote, Patry
asserted, "[s]ubsequently, Professor Goldstein, with no research of his
own, has aped Nimmer's position."' 27
Patry has also criticized the substance of the Goldstein treatise
directly, once in a context in which suggests that when a treatise gets too
far removed from actual law and practice, it will be disregarded. Patry
wrote:
Professor Goldstein, in yet another of his pseudo-economic displace-
ments of Congress's policy and statutory language, has argued that
"courts can be expected to weigh the infringing or non-infringing
nature of the foreign conduct in determining whether the economic
impact on the domestic authorization right is sufficient to justify third-
party relief."
Whatever their other faults may be, fortunately courts have not
lived up to Professor Goldstein's expectations for them. There is no
basis in the statute or legislative history for Professor Goldstein'sjuris-
diction-based-on-the-amount-of-money-lost theory: if a copyright
owner loses x percentage of sales, a court should award relief for
foreign conduct, but if it loses less than that percentage jurisdiction
should be declined. Such a proposal gives even Law & Economics a
bad name. 28
jury needed to have knowledge of particular facts; where no such knowledge was necessary,
plaintiff was permitted to bring suit in any county over which jurisdiction against the
defendant would lie. Although fictions were later developed permitting suits to be brought
even where local knowledge was required, this was not extended to causes of action that arose
outside of England. Until England's adherence to the Brussels Convention onJurisdiction
and Enforcement in Civil and Commercial Matters in 1982 and subsequent English acts that
implemented that convention, English courts routinely refused to hear cases ofinfringement
that occurred overseas, based on the position that copyright infringement was a local and not
a transitory tort. It is noteworthy that the change came for reasons associated with adherence
to the Brussels Convention, not because of a change in the characterization of the cause of
action. Professor Nimmer was simply wrong in asserting that copyright is a transitory tort.
Regrettably, a number of subsequent courts have been also misled by Professor
Nimmer's singular lack of scholarship, citing London Fims for the transitory tort proposition
as if that decision was based on a firm foundation. It is well-past time to reveal that the
transitory tort emperor has no clothes. Either a federal court has jurisdiction under title
U.S.C., [sic] or it has nojurisdiction at all over a daim of copyright infringement.
Id (citations omitted).
126. Il at 469.
127. Id at 467 n.373.
128. Id. at 456 n,338 (citations omitted).
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Yet there is nothing in the case law to suggest that any judges have
affirmatively rejected the Goldstein treatise's view on this topic.'29 They
may simply be unaware of it. The Nimmer treatise is shelf-consumingly
large (by one account sixteen and one-quarter linear inches) 30 and
expensive, and if one thinks of it as authoritative, there is no reason to
consult a second copyright treatise such as Goldstein, much less a
third.' l This is especially true when fellowjudges frequently refer to the
Nimmer treatise in their opinions "as 'the most authoritative treatise on
copyright,' 'renowned,' 'eminent,' 'classic,' 'foremost,' and 'leading'-
even 'the great copyright treatise."" 32
1. Disjointed Works
In one specific instance, in an area of copyright law in which Aimmer
On Copyright and Goldstein's Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice express
opposing views, the resolution reached by a court facing this split in the
treatises is not encouraging. It suggests that the judge decided between
the two treatise positions based on intuition or internal proclivities
rather than undertaking his own deliberative legal research.
The Nimmer and Goldstein treatises differ on whether a copyright-
able ' joint work" requires that the contribution of eachjoint author be
independently copyrightable, or only that the combined result of their
joint efforts be copyrightable.' Unable to blend or reconcile these
129. See id Searches utilizing various forms of the concepts and key terms yielded no relevant results.
130. RichardJ. Greenstone, Book Review, ENT. &SPORTS LAW., Spring 1997, at 14, 14, available at
http://www.jg.com/cop.html.
131. Id.:
My shelf devoted to copyright law books keeps growing. Xunmer on Copyright now holds the
record at 16 1/4 linear inches, followed by a tie between Goldstein's Copyright and Geller's
International Copyright Law and Practice (6 1/2 linear inches each), with Abram's The Law of
Copyright (5 1/2 linear inches) taking up the rear. Now William Patry's newest contender,
Copyright Law and Pactice, neatly moves into third place at 6 1/4 linear inches. The sum of
these parts (41 linear inches)--not to mention my CCH set and other individual
volumes-appears overwhelming at times. Two sets seem just right for most copyright
problems: Auimner on Copyig'ht, obviously, and Patry's Copyright Law and Practice fill the bill.
The reputation and strength of .unmer on Copyright inevitably invites comparison to any
newcomer covering copyright law. I have succumbed to that temptation only because most
entertainment and intellectual property attorneys have an intimate familiarity with .kunmer
on Copyright. Comparison with a known work hopefully will help the reader evaluate
Copyright Law and Practice.
132. Nimmer, supra note 29, at 1240 (footnotes omitted).
133. See, e.g., Scott C. Brophy, joint Authorship Under the Copyright Law, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 451 (1994); Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominnce, and the Capive Collaborator. Preserving the Rights ofJoint
Authors, 50 EMORY LJ. 193 (2001); Laura G. Lape, A Nrrow Iriew of Creative Cooperation: The Current State of
joint Work Doctrine, 61 ALB. L. REv. 43, 51-52 (1997); Russ VerSteeg, Defining "Author"for Purposes of
Copyright, 45 AM. U.L. REv. 1323, 1326-35 (1996); Faye Buckalew, Comment, Joint Authorship in the Second
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disparate directives, in a case captioned Childress v. Taylor,""4 Judge
Newman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
noted, "The Nimmer treatise argues against a requirement of copy-
rightability of each author's contribution, see 1 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 6.07; Professor Goldstein takes the contrary view, see 1 Paul
Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice § 4.2.1.2 (1989), with
the apparent agreement of the Latman treatise, see William F. Patry,
Latman's The Copyright Law 116 (6th ed. 1986).
' 135
One hopes that his decision to go with the Goldstein approach was
not unduly influenced by the fact that the Latman/Patry treatise
concurred, creating a consulted-treatise majority. Judge Newman ulti-
mately concluded that, "[t]he case law supports a requirement of
copyrightability of each contribution,"' 36 citing a string of nine cases
purportedly supporting this position,'37 and distinguishing two cases
proffering alternative views in an appended footnote.'38 Oddly, how-
ever, the very first caseJudge Newman cites as supporting the Goldstein
and Latman/Patry construction of joint authorship, MGB. Homes,
actually cites the Nimmer treatise with approval, apparently adopting
the Nimmer view.139  The M B.G. Homes opinion also cites Meltzer v.
Circuit A Cntique of the Law in the Second Circuit Following Childress v. Taylor and as Exemplified in Thomson v.
Larson, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 545 (1998).
134. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
135. Id at 506.
136. Id
137. Id ("See M G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486,1493 (llthCir.1990); S.O.S., Inc.
v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir.1989); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F.Supp. at 601; Whelan
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratogy, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 1307, 1318-19 (E.D.Pa.1985), affdwithoutconsidera-
tion of this point, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.198
6
), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 877, 93 L.Ed.2d 831
(1987); Kenhrooke Fabrics Inc. v. Material Things, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1039, 1044-45, 1984 WL 532 (S.D.N.Y.1984);
Meltzerv. Zoller, 520 F.Supp. 847, 857 (D.NJ.1981); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Construction
Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 259 (D.Neb. 1982).").
138. Id at 506 n.4:
Two Circuits have adverted to the issue, but found it unnecessary to resolve it. The District
of Columbia Circuit has quoted the passage from the Nimmer treatise that argues against a
requirement of copyrightability for all contributions to a joint work but then discussed the
issue in a footnote beginning "If Nimmer is correct .... " Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 & n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis added), aff'd
without consideration of this point, 490 U.S. 730, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989).
The Third Circuit has explicitly held the issue open. See Andrien v. Southern Ocean County
Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir.1991) (in bane).
(omission in original).
139. MG.B. Homes, 903 F.2dat 1492-93:
The Copyright Act does not definejoint authorship per se. It does state, however, that "[t]he
authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (West
1977) (emphasis added). A 'joint work" is defined as "a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (West 1977). The terms
"inseparable" and "interdependent" may be explained as follows:
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Zoller,14 the sixth case cited byJudge Newman as ostensible precedent
for the Goldstein and Latman/Patry position, for support of the
Nimmer analysis it adopts.
The second case, S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., does appear to support
Judge Newman's assertion, citing and relying primarily on the fourth
case that Newman cites, Jhelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratogy, rather
than any treatise 1"". and also, more incidentally, relies upon a Supreme
Court case. 42 However, upon review it is apparent that this fourth case,
[I]f author B's contribution when combined with author A's contribution results in
recasting, transforming or adapting A's contribution, then the two contributions may be said
to be inseparable. If the process is simply one of assembling into a collective whole A's and
B's respective contributions, without thereby recasting A's contribution, then the two
contributions may be said to be interdependent.
I M. Nimmer and D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.04 at 6-11 (1989). Co-
owners are, of course, equally entitled to claim a copyright in the undivided whole of the
protected work. See 1 Nimmer § 6.03 at 6-6.
(alterations in original).
140. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F.Supp. 847 (D.C.NJ. 1981).
141. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086-87:
A claim ofjoint authorship on similar facts was rejected in Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1318-19 (E.D.Pa.1985), aft'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031,93 L.Ed.2d 831, 107 S.Ct. 877 (1987).. In that case, a dental
laboratory owner commissioned software for use in his business, disclosed to the
programmers the detailed operation of his business, dictated the functions to be performed
by the computer, and even helped design the language and format of some of the screens that
would appear on the computer's visual displays. The court nonetheless found that the
programmer was the sole author of the software. The court's principal focus was on the
creation of the source and object code. The owner's "general assistance and contributions
to the fund of knowledge ofthe author did not make [him] a creator of any original work, nor
even the co-author. It is similar to an owner explaining to an architect the type and functions
of a building the architect is to design for the owner. The architectural drawings are not co-
authored by the owner, no matter how detailed the ideas and limitations expressed by the
owner." i
We conclude that the Whelan court's analysis is sound. Goodman, in our view, is not
a joint author of the payroll programs. She did nothing more than describe the sort of
programs Payday wanted S.O.S. to write. A person who merely describes to an author what
the commissioned work should do or look like is not a joint author for purposes of the
Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a "joint work" as a "work prepared by two or more
authors." To be an author, one must supply more than mere direction or ideas: one must
"translate] an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection."
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 2171, 104 L.Ed.
2d 811 (1989). The supplier of an idea is no more an "author" of a program than is the
supplier of the disk on which the program is stored. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (no copyright
protection for ideas); 17 U.S.C. § 202 (copyright distinct from material object in which work
is embodied).
(alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
142. Justice Marshall's opinion in Commuwiyfor Creative Non- iolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), is
quoted for the proposition that to be an author, one must supply more than mere direction or ideas; one
must "translate[ ] an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection" but this does not
speak directly to the question of whether each joint author's contribution must be independently
copyrightable. l at 737.
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Whelan, 43 does not actually address either side of the interpretive dispute
directly, no less support one or the other. Instead, citing to Aitken (the
seventh case Newman cited in Childress v. Taylor) and urging that Meltzer
(the sixth case Newman cites) be "compared," the opinion primarily
relies on the wording of the definition of 'joint works" in Section 101 of
the Copyright Act,' stating that it is a "work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary work."'' The Whelan
court determined that there was "not a scintilla of evidence that the
parties ever intended" that one individual's insignificant contributions
should merge into the finished work, and that was the basis for the
holding. "
The third case cited by Judge Newman, Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross,
147
rejected an assertion ofjoint authorship based on a factual finding that
the individual claiming joint authorship contributed only ideas, and not
expression. 14' This case does not cite to any treatise directly, but refer-
ences a pertinent passage in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in another copyright case,
Communi!yfor Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, which in turn cites the Nimmer
treatise's position on joint authorship in dicta, though falls short of
wholeheartedly approving the Nimmer view by prefacing a tentative
application of the Nimmer approach to the facts with the words "If
Nimmer is correct."'4 9 While the Nimmer position is not embraced,
143. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
144. 17 U.S.C.§ 1O (2000).
145. W"7danAssocs., Inc., 609 F. Supp. at 1319.
146. Id:
In 17 U.S.C. § 101 the definition of a "joint work" is a "work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary work" There is not a scintilla ofevidence that the parties
ever intended that RandJaslow's contributions, whatever they may have been, should merge
into the final computer design and system. The only suggested merger into the whole might
be the wording and the abbreviations contained on some of the visual screens. His
contributions were not of sufficient significance to constitute him a co-author of the system.
Compare Meltzer v. Zoller 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.NJ. 198 1).
147. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
148. Id. at601:
The foundation of federal copyright law is that only expressions of ideas, not the ideas
themselves, give rise to protected interests. Frybarger v. International Business Machines
Corp, 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players,
Inc. 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037,83 L. Ed. 2d 403, 105 S. Ct.
513 (1984);17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1977). Accordingly, when an author contributes only ideas
to the development of a work, whether or not it is a "joint work," without reducing those
ideas to an expression, that author does not obtain an interest in the work.
149. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1988):
[T] he standard for determining whether a creation is an "original work of authorship" is not
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neither is it overtly rejected. Nor is the contrary Goldstein and Latman/
Patry view explicitly adopted; indeed, it is not even mentioned.
The district court opinion in Ashton was appealed and affirmed. 50
In this decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted that "[a] cademic authorities split on what type of'contri-
bution' the copyright law requires forjoint authorship purposes," 151 and
after asserting that "[t]he rule expressed by the district court-that only
contributors of copyrightable material can be authors of a work-is not
entirely settled,"'52 made the rather surprising statement that, "[t]he
district court adopted the view championed by Professor Goldstein." 53
Perhaps this was the opinion thatJudge Newman meant to cite.
The fifth case in the string citation, Kenbrooke Fabrics v. Material
Things,'54 like the fourth, turns on findings that there was no intention to
create ajoint work and that one party's contribution was insignificant.'55
The sixth case, Meltzer, mirrors the third, Ashton-Tate Corp., in that it is
premised on a finding that an individual contributed ideas only, rather
high. "It suffices if the author refrains from copying from prior works and contributes more
than a minimal amount of creativity." A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN &J. GINSBURG, supra, at
29; see also I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 6.03, at 6-6 and § 6.17, at 6-18
(oint authors need not "work in physical propinquity"; their contributions need not be equal
either quantitatively or qualitatively; though contribution of each must be more than de
minimis, one may qualify as a joint author even if his contribution, "standing alone would
not be copyrightable."
The court also makes a note that:
IfNimmer is correct on the point that the contribution of a joint author need not be copy-
rightable "standing alone," even CCNV's choice of the title "Third World America" and the
legend for the pedestal, 652 F. Supp. at 1454, while not independently copyrightable, see W.
PATRY, supra, at 45-47, may count, along with other CCNV contributions, toward meeting
the "more than de minimis" threshold required for joint authorship.
Id at 1496 n.15.




154. Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Material Things, No. 82 Civ. 7187-CSH, 1984 U.S. Dist. I.EXIS
15458 (S.D.N.Y.June 28, 1984).
155. Id at *19-20:
Bonnici's only contribution prior to creation of the fabric was the general request that
Hargittai create a design incorporating a floral border and stripes, a suggestion that gave rise
to several variations on that theme. In my view, Bonnici and Hargittai cannot be viewed as
proceeding with 'the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole,' so as to render them authors and coowners of a
joint work. Bonnici made no tangible contribution prior to creation of the Hargittai painting,
and it is doubtful that Hargittai was aware of the changes made thereafter. This is not, in
other words, a situation where Bonnici 'played a significant role' in the creation of the design.
(citations omitted).
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than any copyrightable expression. 156  The seventh and final case,
Aitken, 157 rested on findings that one party primarily contributed ideas,
any expression that was contributed was de minimis, and the parties
never had the statutorily required intention to create a joint work of
authorship. It cites Meltzer for support.15'
In the final analysis, though his decision to favor the Goldstein and
Latman/Patry position over Nimmer's on this issue may have been
correct (this article takes no position on that issue), the incestuous
melange of cases cited by Judge Newman do not straightforwardly or
effectively support the conclusion for which he cites them, not even
close.'59 Where did he get the idea that they did? It is possible he or
156. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F.Supp. 847, 857 (D.C.NJ. 1981):
The Chirgotis firm, by fixing the ideas for the Meltzer home in a tangible medium, "created"
those plans, for pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101, a "work" is "created" when "it is fixed in a copy
... for the first time." It logically follows, then, that the Chirgotis firm is the author of these
plans for the purpose of copyright interests. In contrast, ideas are not, as a matter of law,
copyrightable. Mazerv. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18, 74 S.Ct. 460, 470-71, 98 L.Ed. 630
(1954); Hoehlingv. UniversalStdios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972,978 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 841,
101 S.Ct. 121, 66 L.Ed.2d 49 (1980). The ideas and sketches contributed by plaintiff do not
sufficiendy constitute fixed expressions of ideas; therefore, plaintiffis not the "creator" of the
plans for his house for copyright purposes. Without authorship, the sine que non of copyright,
plaintiff has no cause of action.
Nor can the plaintiffbe considered a "joint author" ofthe plans with the Chirgotis firm.
Under the 1976 Act, ajoint work is one "prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions he merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Ofcourse, this would be a fiction here, since plaintiffs failure to
have "created" or "prepared" the work within the meaning of the statute bars his asserting
a copyright interest even as a joint author of the plans.
(footnote omitted).
157. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P. C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Neb.
1982).
158. Id. at 257-58.
159. See supra notes 136-58 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lape, supra note 133, at 51-52:
Given the courts' wariness about joint work doctrine, it is not perhaps surprising that the very
tone in which courts discuss the existence of a joint work is at times inhospitable to the
doctrine. A striking example was the Second Circuit's decision in Childress v. Taylor, in which
the court affirmed a grant ofsummaryjudgment to the plaintiff, a professional writer, on the
grounds that an actress was not a co-author of a play. The Second Circuit justified its
decision to require that each co-author make a copyrightable contribution by arguing that
this requirement "might serve to prevent some spurious claims by those who might otherwise
try to share the fruits of the efforts of a sole author." Aside from the circularity of the
reasoning (it is the court's requirement which makes certain otherwise valid claims spurious),
the picture drawn by the court is of a dishonest interloper trying to hom in on the hard-won
product ofanother's labors. The court struck the same righteous tone in concluding that "[a]
playwright does not so easily acquire a co-author."
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
Mary LaFrance stated:
Although, as noted aboveJudge Leval's analysis of the architecture cases fails to note that
the putative co-authors' contributions in both of those cases were de minimis, and that the
architect's plans in Aitken were prepared largely without the requisite "common design,"
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there is language in Aitken which suggests that the court's finding of a lack ofjoint authorship
intent was partly influenced by the conventional perception of the architect/client
relationship:
It is true that throughout the evolution of the 1820-22 architectural plans [the client]
Belmont contributed ideas, directed certain changes be made, and exercised approval power
at the completion ofeach stage of development of the plans. Such involvement by a client in
the preparation of architectural plans is normally expected; See Meltzer v. Zalifr, supra. Such
involvement does not, however, ordinarily render the client an "author" of the architectural
plans ....
... [I]t was intended that the "general client and engineer relationship" exist between
the plaintiff and Belmont. In this relationship, it is quite normal for the client to supply the
engineer or architect with general design features which the client expects to be incorporated
into the architectural plans and for the professional then to create the design drawings
incorporating those features.
Aitken, 542 F. Supp. at 259. Indeed, a district court later cited Aitken for the
extraordinary proposition that "architectural drawings are not co-authored by the owner, no
matter how detailed the ideas and limitations expressed by the owner." 14helan Assocs. v.
Joslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp' 1307, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (dicta), affd, 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986). Note, however, that both passages in Aitken could also be read simply as
elaborating on the "de minimis" or non-copyrightable nature of the client's contribution
(general design features which arguably were more like "ideas" than copyrightable
expression); indeed, the first passage appeared within a paragraph discussing "authorship,"
and only the second passage appeared in the discussion labeled "intention."
LaFrance, supra note 133, at 218 n. 102 (omissions and alteration in original); cf Fisher v. Klein, No. 86 Civ.
9522 PNL, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19463, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.June 26, 1990):
These cases ofAiken and Metzer are cases that involve architects and architecture. In many
forms of art, and very characteristically in architecture, the client of the architect makes
suggestions to the architect about how architectural plans should be modified: "Let's add a
window here." "Let's change this this way." And characteristically architects adopt their
client's suggestions. The same can happen in many other forms of authorship and art.
An artist who paints a picture can show it to a friend as critic and the friend can say,
"I think it would be better if you made certain changes," and the artist can make those
changes. It does not follow that because suggestions are made and adopted that a joint
copyright has been created, because there is this additional requirement of the shared
intention that the contributions be merged into a unitary whole, that is to say, into a work of
joint authorship. It is only where that dominant author intends to be sharing authorship that
joint authorship will result. It is not, as I said previously, every time a sculptor, author,
painter, composer, architect, writer, whatever, it is not every time one of those accepts
suggestions from some other person that joint authorship has resulted. But if the shared
intention of merged contributions exists, and there is in fact a contribution by the second
person to the work, then joint authorship has resulted.
And it is on this basis that the case is clearly distinguishable from cases like Aitken and
Meltzer, which have been cited by the plaintiff. The basis being that I find at the time of the
creation of these works Mr. Fisher saw this as a creative collaboration, notwithstanding that
he was, far away, the dominant contributor to the creative collaboration.
Bra see VerSteeg, supra note 133, at 1331:
Both Childress and Erickson seem appealing. The basic copyright doctrine they espouse is that
an author is the person who creates a copyrightable work. And, in order to be copyrightable,
a work must be "original" and "fixed" in a "tangible medium of expression." Thus, if a
putative author produces something that is not fixed - in other words, something that is an
intangible idea-he is not an "author" for copyright purposes.
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Although many cases prior to Childress and Eric/kon had championed this approach,
two groups of cases (with facts similar to one another) had firmly established this
copyrightability requirement. Meltzer v. Zoller, Aitlen, Haze, Hffiman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire
Construction Co., and M G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc. are cases involving homeowners
who drew sketches and made suggestions for their architects. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., and Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross are cases where
individuals provided a list of specifications and made suggestions to a computer
programmer. In both of these situations, the outcomes are consistent. The architects and
programmers successfully argued that the parties who had provided only sketches,
specifications, and suggestions could not be considered "authors" because they had
contributed merely intangible ideas that were uncopyrightable. The Ninth Circuit's holding
in S.O.S. is representative of this approach. The S.O.S. court, relying on justice Marshall's
dictum in Community for Creative .Kn- Vilence v. Reid, held that "[t]o be an author, one must
supply more than mere direction or ideas; one must 'translate[ ] an idea into a fixed
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection."
(footnotes omitted) (alteration in original). Brophy, supra note 133, at 469-70:
In S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., the Ninth Circuit ruled that a person who described the needs
of her company to a software programmer, and who told the programmer what tasks the
software should perform and how to sort data, was not a joint author of the software. The
court, relying on Wkelan Assocates, Inc. v. Joslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., held that "a person who
merely describes to an author what the commissioned work should do or look like is not a
joint author for purposes of the Copyright Act." The court also cited the Supreme Court's
definition of author as the definition required by the Copyright Act's "joint work" definition.
It was in Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, however, that the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that
joint authorship requires each author to make a copyrightable contribution. In this case,
the defendant, Ross, and a man by the name of Wigginton agreed to write a computer
program. The program was a spreadsheet to be called "MacCalc." Ross was to work on
the "engine" of the program, and Wigginton was to work on the program interface. To
assist Wigginton, Ross contributed a list of handwritten commands to use in the interface.
Eventually the two had disagreements and split up. Wigginton took his interface to Ashton-
Tate, the plaintiff, for use in a spreadsheet program. Together they developed "Full
Impact." Ross created "McCabe," also a spreadsheet program. Ashton-Tate sought a
declaratoryjudgment asking that it be dedared the copyright owner of all the "Full Impact"
software. Ross counter-claimed damages for Ashton-Tate's use of his commands in their
program.
The Ninth Circuit held that Ross was not ajoint author of the "Full Impact" program.
The court held that the commands were mere ideas, not expression; therefore Ross could not
be considered an author entitled to copyright protection. The court used rationale similar
to that used by the court in S.O.S, Inc. It compared the Nimmer and Goldstein points of view
and concluded that Goldstein's was the better view. The court concluded that although "this
issue is not completely settled in the case law, our circuit holds that joint authorship requires
each author to make an independently copyrightable contribution."
The Tenth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, but the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
MG.B Honmes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc. supports the majority position. In this case, M.G.B.
claimed that Ameron copied one of its floor plans for a home design. M.G.B. distributed an
advertising flyer depicting the floor plan and measurements. M.G.B. claimed that Ameron
used the flyer to design a similar home. The actual floor'plan was drafted by Unlimited
Drafting Services, and the copyright was listed under M.G.B.'s name as a work-made-for-
hire.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the work was not a work-made-for-hire. Although
M.G.B. exercised control and direction over the finished product, the facts showed that
Unlimited was an independent contractor. The court then discussed whether M.G.B. and
Unlimited could be considered joint authors due to the control and direction of the product
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his clerks read the cited cases but somewhat misunderstood them. It is
much more likely that he did not read them in full text, but rather
cribbed the string citation from the Goldstein treatise after deciding to
adopt its reasoning. In so doing, he relied upon the accuracy of that
treatise, a reliance that in this instance was clearly and demonstrably
misplaced. The Goldstein treatise used these cases to create the facade
of stare decisis in support of the treatise's position on this issue, to gener-
ate the appearance that this was settled, rather than suggested, legal
doctrine. Further evidence suggesting that the citations were lifted
without careful scrutiny from the Goldstein treatise comes from Judge
Newman's otherwise somewhat startling reference (paralleling one in
Goldstein 60 ) to the fact that "[t]he Register of Copyrights strongly sup-
ports this view" as his only reference to anything resembling legislative
history on this point. 6 ' In the final analysis, Judge Newman or his
clerks arguably failed to heed one legal academic's explicit admonition
to law students, "Never rely on a secondary source (an article, a book),
for the holding of a case. Cite the case directly. Read the case yourself.
The alternative is malpractice. And low grades too." '162
One might conclude that in this battle of the copyright treatises, the
losers were accuracy and coherence in the copyright law.'63 Ironically
and somewhat surprisingly, after discussing the matter so extensively,
and then unequivocally picking the Goldstein approach over the
Nimmer view, Judge Newman concluded this portion of his opinion by
stating that given the facts of the Childress v. Taylor dispute, whether the
that M.G.B. exhibited. The court held that M.G.B. was not a joint author of the floor plan.
To be considered a joint author, the court would require the author to be a "creator." To
be a creator, the author must fix his expression in a copy. It is the "preparer" of the work
who is considered the author. In this case, however, M.G.B. just provided Unlimited with
rough sketches of how the home should look. The sketch did not form an inseparable part
of the finished work, so it was clear that M.G.B. could not be considered a creator.
(footnotes omitted).
160. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAiv AND PRACTICE § 4.2.1.1 & n.23 (1989).
161. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991).
162. Michael Froomkin, University of Miami College of Law, Froomkin's Legal Writing Tips, at
http://www.lawmiami.edu/-froomkin/writingtips.html (last modified Sept. 3, 2003):
Not all authority is of equal weight.
1. A no-name is less persuasive as an authority than a major treatise by a famous
author, or a decision by the Supreme Court. Some lower court judges have a reputation that
makes their decisions more significant; but most do not. If you rely on Prof. Joe Schmoe as
your main authority, do not trumpet Schmoe's name throughout your text. Schmoes belong
in footnotes. Justices Brennan and Scalia belong in the text.
2. Never rely on a secondary source (an article, a book), for the holding of a case. Cite
the case directly. Read the case yourself. The alternative is malpractice. And low grades
too,
163. ToJudge Newman's credit, he has been critical ofover reliance on the Nimmer treatise by courts.
See in4fa notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
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contribution made by the party seeking joint authorship status was
independently copyrightable did not even have to be reached.' 64
The current version of the Nimmer treatise processes and explains
Newman's words in Childress v. Taylor, and the later cases that follow
Newman's reasoning,165 by forthrightly acknowledging that "the
prevailing view in the case law flatly rejects the notion that contribution
of ideas may suffice to qualify a contributor as a joint author,"' 166 but
asserts that this conclusion is incorrect, and in conflict with the language
and legislative history of the Copyright Act. The Nimmer treatise
steadfastly maintains that "copyright's goal of fostering creativity is best
served... by rewarding all parties who labor together to unite idea with
form, and that copyright protection should extend both to the
contributor of the skeletal ideas and the contributor who fleshes out the
project,"167 and explicitly and correctly (if somewhat defensively) notes:
In the Second Circuit, the issue has been called both "open" and
"troublesome." Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,506 (2d Cir. 1991)
(Treatise cited). Childress sides with the prevailing view, id. at 507;
164. C&hilress, 945 F.2d at 509:
We need not determine whether we agree with [the District CourtJudge's] conclusion that
Taylor's contributions were not independently copyrightable since, even if they were
protectable as expression or as an original selection of facts, we agree that there is no
evidence from which a trier could infer that Childress had the state of mind required for joint
authorship.
165. One cannot accurately say "follow its holding" since in fact the resolution of this issue and
everything that precedes it in the opinion is arguably dicta.
166. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRI;HT, supra note 13, § 6.07 (2004):
It must be admitted that this proposition has been soundly rejected in the architectural
context, holding that a client who contributes ideas to be used in plans is not ajoint author
with the architect in the final plans. In addition, even outside the architectural context, the
prevailing view in the case law flatly rejects the notion that contribution of ideas may suffice
to qualify a contributor as ajoint author, although in some courts, the question remains open
"whether each author of a joint work must make an independendy copyrightable
contribution."
Notwithstanding the foregoing trend in the cases, neither the text nor legislative history
of the Act supports that conclusion. The definition in the Act adverts to a "work prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged ..." That
language contains no requirement that each contribute an independently copyrightable
component to the joint work. The legislative history similarly elevates intention as the
touchstone, without placing any further parsing as to the copyrightable status of each
individual component that the parties intend to contribute to the work as a whole. It is
submitted that copyright's goal of fostering creativity is best served, particularly in the motion
picture context, by rewarding all parties who labor together to unite idea with form, and that
copyright protection should extend both to the contributor of the skeletal ideas and the
contributor who fleshes out the project. On the other hand, ifA and B are not collaborators,
i.e., do not work in furtherance of a common design, then the fact that B writes a work based
upon A's nouprutectible idea, will not render A a joint author with B.
(footnotes omitted).
167. Id.
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but its discussion is dictum, given that it did not reach the issue as to
whether the subject contribution was independently copyrightable, id.
at 509.6
Nevertheless, the Childress dictum was adopted as law by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 6 9 and by two district
courts in Louisiana, 7 ' explicitly on the strength of the Newman and
Goldstein analysis.
2. An Irresolvable Split in the Treatises
Neils Shauman has recently written that both he and Marshall Leaffer
agree that an underlying theme in recent copyright decisions by the
Supreme Court is "the Court's remarkable deference to Congress."'
' 71
Equally astounding to this author is the degree of deference often
exhibited by the federal courts to the Nimmer treatise. In one fairly
recent case a court felt compelled to "clarify" part of an opinion that
had been premised upon analysis in the Nimmer treatise subsequently
found to be flawed, writing:
In saying that "an owner of a particular right-as opposed to the
copyright itself-would not be a copyright owner," Morris v. Business
Concepts, Inc., 259 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2001), WE RELIED UPON THE
GREAT COPYRIGHT TREATISE, 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, Nimmer on Copyright § 10.02 [C] [2], at 10-28 (2000):
"IT]here is never more than a single copyright in a work,
notwithstanding the author's exclusive license of certain rights."
While Nimmer is supported by at least one other treatise, Boors-yn
on Copyright, others are not so clear or perhaps are even contrary."
72
The short opinion goes on to reference the Boorstyn, Goldstein,
Abrams, and Latman/Patry treatises in the text and footnotes.
Ironically, after referring to the Nimmer treatise as "great," (although
demonstrably wrong in this instance), and having indicated that it
consulted four other copyright treatises as well, the court adopted the
168. Id. § 6.07 n.6.
169. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1994) ("On this point, we find
ourselves in agreement with the analysis ofJudge Newman writing for the Second Circuit in Childress....
Like the Second Circuit in Childress, we believe that the statutory language clearly requires that each author
intend that their respective contributions be merged into a unitary whole.").
170. See BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. La. 1999); Visitor Indus. Pubis., Inc. v. NOPG,
LL.C., 91 F. Supp. 2d 910, 914-15 (E.D. La. 2000).
171. Neil s S chaumann, Copyrigh Containers, and the Court A Reply to Professor Leaffer, 3 0 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV 1617, 1617-18 (2004).
172. Morris v. Business Concepts, Inc., 283 F.3d 502, 503-04 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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reasoning of the Copyright Office on the disputed issue only after
explicitly noting, "[w]e recognize that 'the Copyright Office has no
authority to give opinions or define legal terms, and its interpretation on
an issue never before decided should not be given controlling
weight."" 73 The court obviously believed that Copyright Office publica-
tions, unlike for-profit copyright treatises, should be viewed warily and
with extreme caution. Perhaps the judges would have been reassured
by the fact that the Copyright Office periodically relies on the Nimmer
treatise as well, as it did, for example: When crafting exceptions to the
anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA);1 74 when declining to establish a group registration procedure
for collections of both published and unpublished photographs; 17, when
amending its regulations to permit copyright registration for pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works for which a design patent had issued; 76
173. Id. at 505-06:
We recognize that "the Copyright Office has no authority to give opinions or define legal
terms, and [that] its interpretation on an issue never before decided should not be given
controlling weight," Bartok v. Boosg & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 946-47 (2d Cir. 1975)
(footnotes omitted). In this case, however, we find the Office's interpretation persuasive. Cf
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2175, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001)
(noting that even where an agency's interpretation of law is not entitled to highly deferential
treatment pursuant to Che'ron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), "an agency's interpretation may merit some
deference whatever its form, given the 'specialized experience and broader investigations and
information' available to the agency" (quoting Skidimore v. &ift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139, 65
S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944)). Accordingly, we hold that unless the copyright owner of
a collective work also owns all the rights in a constituent part, a collective work registration
will not extend to a constituent part.
174. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,560 n.5 (Oct. 27, 2000):
A leading treatise draws the following conclusion from this language:
It would seem, therefore, that the language should be applied to discrete subgroups.
If users of physics textbooks or listeners to Baroque concerti, for example, find themselves
constricted in the new Internet environment, then some relief will lie. If, on the other hand,
the only unifying feature shared by numerous disgruntled users is that each is having trouble
accessing copyrighted works, albeit of different genres, then no relief is warranted. I
Nimmer on Copyright § 12A.03[A][[2][b] (Copyright Protection Systems Special
Pamphlet).
175. See Registration of Claims to Copyright, Group Registration of Photographs, 65 Fed. Reg.
26,162, 26,164 (May 5, 2000):
Notwithstanding such concerns, the Office has concluded that it cannot establish a group
registration procedure that permits claimants to include both published and unpublished
photographs within a single group registration due to their inability to determine whether a
particular photograph has been published. A procedure permitting inclusion of both
published and unpublished works in a single registration would be unprecedented and would
ignore critical distinctions between the copyright law's treatment of published works and its
treatment of unpublished works. See, e.g., I Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 4.01 [A] (1999).
176. See Registrability of Pictorial, Graphic, or Sculptural Works Where a Design Patent Has Been
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when documenting U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention; 77 and,
in the context of deciding that "colorized" versions of motion pictures
could be registered, three separate times for the proposition that,
"[c]ourts have held that while colorper se is uncopyrightable and unre-
gistrable, arrangements or combinations of colors may warrant copy-
right protection."' 78 In the final example, the Copyright Office
obviously found it more efficient to repeatedly cite only the Nimmer
treatise, rather than to the referenced "courts" themselves." '
In a very important case concerning the impact of copyright laws on
consumer goods, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit wrote:
In our view, the district court committed three related legal errors in
determining that Lexmark had a likelihood of prevailing on its
copyright claim with respect to the Toner Loading Program. First,
the district court concluded that, because the Toner Loading Program
"could be written in a number of different ways," it was entitled to
copyright 'protection. In refusing to consider whether "external
factors such as compatibility requirements, industry standards, and
efficiency" circumscribed the number of forms that the Toner
Loading Program could take, the district court believed that the idea-
expression divide and accompanying principles of merger and scbnes
A faire play a role only in the "substantial similarity" analysis and do
not apply when the first prong of the infringement test
(copyrightability) is primarily at issue. In taking this path, the district
court relied on cases invoking Nimmer's pronouncement that the
Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 15605, 15606 (Mar. 24, 1995):
The Copyright Office regulations based on the election doctrine have been criticized. In his
treatise on copyright, Nimmer observes:
Without offering the rationale of publication or any other basis, Copyright Office
Regulations under the 1909 Act simply provided that once a patent has been issued,
copyright registration would be denied to a work of art and to a scientific or technical
drawing. There appears to be no statutory or other justification for this position. It would
seem on principle that if a work otherwise meets the requirements of copyrightability, it
should not be denied such simply because the claimant happens to be entitled to
supplementary protection under other legislation. David Nimmer and Melville B. Nimmer,
.Mqmmer on Copyright§ 2.19 (1994).
We agree.
In consideration of the foregoing, the Copyright Office is issuing this Policy
Decision and amending 37 CFR chapter II in the manner set forth below.
177. See Request for Information: Study on Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks, 57 Fed. Reg.
24659, 24660 n.2 (June 10, 1992) ("The Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed
at Beme, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886. The United States adhered to the 1971 Paris text of the
Convention. See, M. Nionmer, Nimmer on Copyright, App.").
178. Registration of Claims to Copyright Notice of Inquiry: Colorization of Motion Pictures, 51 Fed.
Reg. 32,665, 32,666 (Sept. 15, 1986).
179. See, e.g., Copyright Registration for Colorized Versions of Black and White Motion Pictures, 52
Fed. Reg. 23443, 23444 (June 22, 1987).
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idea-expression divide "constitutes not so much a limitation on the
copyrightability of works, as it is a measure of the degree of similarity
that must exist between a copyrightable work and an unauthorized
copy." Nimmer § 2.03[D]. And in concluding more generally that
the copyrightability of a computer program turns solely on the avail-
ability of other options for writing the program, the court relied on
several cases from other circuits. 8 °
The court concluded that the erroneous reasoning of "cases invoking
Nimmer's pronouncement" on "the idea-expression divide" concerning
the measure of similarity, conflicted with the Supreme Court's holding
in the Feist"8 ' case.' 8 2 In the very next paragraph, with respect to the
"number of different ways" analysis, the court somewhat confusing
asserted that that the district court was not supported by Nimmer,
writing:
As a matter of practice, Nimmer is correct that courts most commonly
discuss the idea-expression dichotomy in considering whether an
original work and a partial copy of that work are "substantially
similar" (as part of prong two of the infringement test), since the copy-
rightability of a work as a whole (prong one) is less frequently con-
tested. But the idea-expression divide figures into the substantial
similarity test not as a measure of "similarity"; it distinguishes the
original work's protectable elements from its unprotectable ones, a
distinction that allows courts to determine whether any of the former
have been copied in substantial enough part to constitute infringe-
ment. Both prongs of the infringement test, in other words, consider
"copyrightability," which at its heart turns on the principle that copy-
right protection extends to expression, not to ideas.
18 3
In ultimately reaching its decision to reverse the district court opinion,
the Sixth Circuit seemed to disagree with the Nimmer treatise, the
district court's interpretation of the Nimmer treatise, and the district
court's decision to follow cases that either adopted or failed to correctly
interpret various directives of the Nimmer treatise. In this author's
view, in the interests of both clarity and democracy, the court should
have jettisoned its discussion of the Nimmer treatise altogether, and
instead focused on the facts, issues and preceding case law before it.
180. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537-38 (6th Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
181. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 1199 1).
182. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 387 F.3d at 538.
183. Id.
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It is also worth noting that the Sixth Circuit majority opinion unam-
biguously relied on the Nimmer treatise five times,'8 4 and also relied on
a case that it parenthetically noted quotes Nimmer. '85 The dissent cited
approvingly to Nimmer as well.'86 Though the court strongly implied
that the Nimmer treatise lead courts astray with respect to the legal issue
before it, the court continued to view and treat other provisions of the
treatise as unequivocally authoritative.
3. Authoring the Writing Requirement
When treatises do not conflict, or perhaps when only one is consulted,
treatise authors can make law rather seamlessly. Consider that Section
204(a) of the Copyright Act states rather unambiguously that, "[a]
transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not
valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of
the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed
or such owner's duly authorized agent." '87 Section 101 defines "transfer
of copyright ownership" as "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license,
or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or
of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not
it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive
license." g' One way to interpret the exemption of nonexclusive licenses
is as an effort to emphasize the fact that a nonexclusive license does not
convey an ownership interest in the underlying copyright. The Nimmer
treatise reads into the confluence of these statutory provisions the idea
that the writing requirement applies only to exclusive licenses, writing:
It will be recalled that the requirement of a written instrument applies
solely to a "transfer of copyright ownership," which by definition does
not include nonexclusive licenses. By negative implication, nonexclu-
sive licenses may therefore be granted orally, or may even be implied
from conduct. When the totality of the parties' conduct indicates an
intent to grant such permission, the result is a nonexclusive license. 
8 9
In reliance on Nimmer's interpretation, courts have upheld "implied
nonexclusive licenses" that are not in writing. For example, in Effects
Associates, Inc. v. Cohen'9° the Ninth Circuit wrote, "[t]he leading treatise
184. 1d. at 534, 535 (twice), 543, 549.
185. Id at 545.
186. Id at 559 (Feikens,J., dissenting in part).
187. 17 U.S.C. §204 (a) (2000).
188. Id § 101.
189. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 10.3[A] [7] (2004).
190. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
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on copyright law states that '[a] nonexclusive license may be granted
orally, or may even be implied from conduct,"' and cites to the Nimmer
treatise.191 Later editions of the Nimmer treatise in turn cite Effects
Associates, Inc. as support for this proposition, in addition to numerous
other cases, almost all of which carry the appended parenthetical
notations of "Treatise cited" or "Treatise quoted." 9 ' In this way the
191. Id at 558 (citing 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supranote 13, § 10.03[A] (1989)). The court also
relied on Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984), in which the contribution to a partnership venture was
at issue.
192. The four footnotes giving authority to the above quotation from the treatise are as follows:
[Footnote] 67. I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996) (Treatise quoted). See
17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
[Footnote] 68. Kennedy v. National Juvenile Detention Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir.
1999) (Treatise cited), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1159 (2000);Johnson v.Jones, 149 F.3d 494,
500 (6th Cir. 1998) (Treatise quoted); Graham v.James, 144 F.3d 229, 235"(2d Cir. 1998)
(Treatise quoted); Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broadcast Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 879
(5th Cir. 1997) (Treatise quoted); Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821,
826 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001) (Treatise cited); Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Treatise quoted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991); RT Computer Graphics,
Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 747, 754 (1999) (Treatise cited); Ladas v. Potpourri Press,
Inc., 846 F. Supp. 221, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (Treatise quoted); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616,627 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (Treatise quoted), afld (rev'd only
as to fees), 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1184 (1995); Systems XIX,
Inc. v. Parker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (Treatise cited); Data Gen. Corp.
v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1167 n.35 (1st Cir. 1994) (Treatise cited);
Herbert v. U.S., 32 Fed. Cl. 293, 298 (Fed. Cl. 1994) (Treatise cited); Herbert v. U.S., 36
Fed. Cl. 299, 310 (Fed. Cl. 1996) (Treatise cited); Pamfiloffv. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F.
Supp. 933, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (Treatise cited); Silva v. MacLaine, 697 F. Supp. 1423,
1430 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (Treatise cited), afld mem., 888 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen,
Inc. , 952 F.2d 769, 779 (3d Cir. 1991) (Treatise cited) (but licensee who exceeds scope of
implied license may be held infringing). See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Treatise cited); Library Publications, Inc. v. Medical Economics Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1231 (E.D. Pa. 1982), afl'd mem., 714 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1983); Love v. Kwitny, 706
F. Supp. 1123, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
[Footnote] 69. Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 826 n.9 (9th Cir.
2001) (Treatise quoted); id, at 837 (Treatise quoted) (Kozinski,J., concurring); Johnson v.
Jones, 921 F. Supp. 1573 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (Treatise cited) (finding no such intent). See
Johnson v.Jones, 885 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (Treatise quoted), later appeal,
149 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 1998) ("every objective fact . .. points away from the existence
of an implied license").
[Footnote] 69.1. Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broadcast Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 879
(5th Cir. 1997) (Treatise cited); Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp.
2d 823, 831 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (Treatise quoted) (totality of circumstances indicate no license,
where evidence shows that copyright owner turned down $ 1 million offer, and was claimed
to have agreed six months later to accept $ 31,500). See SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan
House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (construing sale of photos to
convey no implied copyright license, but rather so that the photos themselves may serve as
sales tools).
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 10.3[A] [7] nn.67, 68, 69 & 69.1 (2004).
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treatise's position on ,this issue has become entrenched and seemingly
authoritative. It is so authoritative that in reliance on the treatise's
statements on this issue and the impressive list of cases that have
followed it, a court might not even consider an alternative approach,
despite the fact that there may be persuasive justifications in favor of
requiring a writing for enforceable nonexclusive licenses. These argu-
ments might include: Ensuring that authors will not give away their
copyrights inadvertently; forcing the parties to determine precisely what
rights are being transferred and at what price; and serving "as a
guidepost for the parties to resolve their disputes" so they will less readily
need to turn to courts when there are disputes about the nature of the
agreement. 93 Perhaps the Nimmer view is, on balance, the correct one,
193. Konigsberg Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining writing requirement
of 204(a)); see also Robert Kreiss, The "In tr'Viting" Requirement for Copyrght and Patent Yansfers: Are the Circuits
in Conflict?, 26 DAYTON L. REV. 43 (2000). The full text of this section of the treatise, denoted "Nimmer at
10.03 [AJ[7] -Grants of Nonexclusive Licenses," reads as follows:
It will be recalled that the requirement of a written instrument applies solely to a "transfer
of copyright ownership, ' which by definition does not include nonexclusive licenses. By
negative implication, nonexclusive licenses may therefore be granted orally, or may even be
implied from conduct. When the totality ofthe parties' conduct indicates an intent to grant
such permission, the result is a nonexclusive license. This principle continues the provisions
of the 1909 Act, which similarly validated licenses even if oral or implied.
It has been held that an implied license requires more than a general intent of the
author regarding disposition of his work. As with any other license, the terms--including
identity of the licensee-should be reasonably clear. Courts have tried to lay down the
various factors that determine when an implied nonexclusive license has been granted. The
Fourth Circuit, in particular,
["Isuggests that the existence of an implied nonexclusive license in a particular situation
turns on at least three factors: (1) whether the parties were engaged in a short-term discrete
transaction as opposed to an ongoing relationship; (2) whether the creator utilized written
contracts, such as the standard AIA [architectural] contract [there at issue], providing that
copyrighted materials could only be used with the creator's future involvement or express
permission; and (3) whether the creator's conduct during the creation or delivery of the
copyrighted material indicated that use of the material without the creator's involvement or
consent was permissible. ['1
Other courts have also followed this non-exhaustive "list of factors to be considered."
What if the oral contract between the parties itself provides unambiguously for the
transfer to be exclusive? In that event, the statutory bar on exclusive grants being executed
orally invalidates the subject contract from taking effect. But the further question arises:
May a court accord partial significance to the attempted grant by construing it as an effective,
albeit nonexclusive, license? To do so would raise serious questions under contract law, as
the enterprise would plainly contravene the mutual intent of the parties. Yet the Eleventh
Circuit has answered that question in the affirmative, without paying much heed to those
aspects of contract law. The Fifth Circuit has agreed, citing the proposition that courts
should "sever the illegal portion of the agreement and enforce the remainder if the parties
would have entered the agreement absent the illegal portion of the original bargain."
One case holds that such implied licenses are legal, rather than equitable. On the facts
of that case, the court rejected the equitable argument that full payment was a condition
precedent for the license to be effective, given that such condition was not spelled out in
"plain, unambiguous terms." This reasoning is peculiar, inasmuch as oral and implied
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but it would be reassuring if competing approaches were explicitly ruled
out by the courts, rather than seemingly ignored.
4. Myriad Areas of Unilateral Impact
Even a casual perusal of any major copyright treatise reveals
numerous additional instances of the treatise author choosing between
copyright doctrines and policies, anointing some judicial opinions as
"the law" and relegating others to the "but see" category. For example,
the position of the Nimmer treatise on the correct application of the
merger doctrine relies on the rationale that it helps prevent anti-
competitive behavior. This interpretation has been adopted by several
courts, while a scholarly critique of the Nimmer view has received
substantially less judicial traction. 9 ' The Nimmer treatise may be
correct to the extent there is an objectively right way to apply the
merger doctrine, but there is little indication that the contrary views of
legal scholars are even considered by the courts that adopt the Nimmer
treatise approach.
The doctrine of fair use is always controversial and of acute interest
to academics, especially in the context of nonprofit educational uses. In
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,'95 the Sixth Circuit
decided that commercial copy shops could not stand in the shoes of
professors and students and assert the third parties' statutory fair use
rights to make "multiple copies for classroom use."' 96 The authority
cited by the court on this point was the Latman/Patry copyright
treatise, "' which in turn relied on only one solitary, controversial district
court case' 98 to support this exposition of the law, treating what is
arguably quite gray as well established black letter law. Once this
licenses, by their very nature, can seldom specify unambiguously the pertinent payment
obligations.
It should not be concluded that writings are therefore utterly without consequences in
the sphere ofnonexclusive licenses. Beyond the greater ease ofproving such a license when
it is evidenced by a writing rather than though possibly conflicting testimony, written grants
of nonexclusive licenses can also exert significance in the event of a conflicting transfcr of
copyright ownership.
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 10.3[A[71 (2004).
194. Shubhah Ghosh, Copyight as Pivatization: 77e Case of Modd Codes, 78 TUL L. REV. 653 (2004).
195. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
196. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
197. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1389 (quoting WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGIE
IN COPYRIGHT L%.W, 420 n.
3 4
. (2d ed. 1995)).
198. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). But see, e.g.,
Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Rectaiiting te Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149
(1999).
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approach was adhered to by the Sixth Circuit, however, it certainly
gained gravitas.
When making a critical determination about whether fair use applied
to manufacturers or distributors of circumvention devices,' 9 one federal
court summarily relied on the Nimmer treatise's assertion that it did not,
rather than making an independent assessment of the plain and actual
meaning of the DMCA, or of congressional intent.2 0 The court did not
even mention the specific applicable statutory provision arguably at
issue, § 120(c)(1), deeming the citation to the Nimmer treatise completely
dispositive despite the fact that this was one of the first cases brought
under the DMCA, and the issue was one of first impression. 2"' The
court wrote:
Under the DMCA, product developers do not have the right to
distribute products that circumvent technological measures that
prevent consumers from gaining unauthorized access to or making
unauthorized copies of works protected by the Copyright Act. Instead,
Congress specifically prohibited the distribution of the tools by which
such circumvention could be accomplished. The portion of the
Streambox VCR that circumvents the technological measures that
prevent unauthorized access to and duplication of audio and video
content therefore runs afoul of the DMCA.
... THIS POINT IS UNDERSCORED BY THE LEADING TREATISE ON
COPYRIGHT, which observes that the enactment of the DMCA means
that "those who manufacture equipment and products generally can
no longer gauge their conduct as permitted or forbidden by reference
to the Sony doctrine. For a given piece of machinery might qualify as
a stable item of commerce, with a substantial noninfringing use, and
hence be immune from attack under Sony's construction of the
Copyright Act- but nonetheless still be subject to suppression under
Section 1201." 1 Jimmer on Copyright (1999 Supp.) § 12A.18[B]. As
such, "equipment manufacturers in the twenty-first century will need
to vet their products for compliance with Section 1201 in order to
avoid a circumvention claim, rather than under Sony to negate a
copyright claim." Id.
202
In the context of "improper appropriation," a touchstone of copyright
infringement culpability, the Nimmer treatise makes the somewhat
199. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc, No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D.
Wash.Jan. 18, 2000).
200. Id at *22.
201. Id at *22. This was pointed out in a somewhat different context in Eddan Elizafon Katz, Anti-
Ciranvention Provisions: RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. & Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,
16 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 53, 66-67 (2001).
202. RealAetwrks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *22.23 (emphasis added).
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stunning assertion that Shakespeare's Romeo and juliet and the musical
West Side Stoy 2°3 are substantially similar in expression. 2' The treatise
acknowledges that some courts might fail to "accept the above pattern
as a sufficiently concrete expression of an idea so as to warrant a finding
of substantial similarity," but strongly implies that this alternative view
would be incorrect." 5 It also articulates the dubious concepts of
203. West Side Stoiy is the story ofa U.S. born Polish boy and a Puerto Rican girl newly arrived in New
York, set against the backdrop of clashing street gangs on the city's West side. Things look good for the
young lovers in the beginning, but when Tony-much like Romeo-accidentally kills Maria's brother while
trying to break up a rumble, violence erupts and tragedy ensues. See, e.g., The Official Westside Story
Website, available at http://www.westsidestory.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
204. 4 NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 13.03[A][l][b] (2004):
Because it involved a romance between members of two warring juvenile gangs in
contemporary New York City, at first glance it might appear that [West Side Slog] would no
more constitute an infringement of "Romeo and Juliet" than does "Abie's Irish Rose."
Certainly, the dialogue and setting, and even much of the characterization, story line and
action, are far removed from the Shakespeare play. Yet, applying the pattern test, it will be
seen that not merely the basic idea, but the essential sequence of events, as well as the
interplay of the characters, are straight out of "Romeo and Juliet." Thus, the following
elements (among others) are found in both works:
1. The boy and girl are members of hostile groups.
2. They meet at a dance.
3. They acknowledge their love in a nocturnal balcony (fire escape) scene.
4. The girl is betrothed to another.
5. The boy and girl assume the marriage vows.
6. In an encounter between the hostile groups, the girl's cousin (brother) kills the boy's best
friend.
7. This occurs because the boy attempts to stay the hand of his best friend in order to avoid
violence.
8. In retaliation, the boy kills the girl's cousin (brother).
9. As a result, the boy goes into exile (hiding).
10. A message is sent to the boy at his retreat, explaining a plan for him to meet the girl.
11. The message never reaches the boy.
12. The boy receives erroneous information that the girl is dead.
13. In grief, the boy kills himself (or permits himself to be killed).
The 13 points enumerated above constitute a description that is, in some degree, abstract in
that many dissimilar details and some important story points in one or the other of the two
works under comparison have been omitted. Still, this description is far from the highest
possible level of abstraction, wherein only the basic idea.,.could be stated. These 13 points
are sufficiently concrete to state the essential sequence of events and character interplay in
each of the two works. Because this pattern is common to both works, it may be concluded
that they are substantially similar.
205. 4id.:
It must be said that not all courts would accept the above pattern as a sufficiently concrete
expression of an idea so as to warrant a finding of substantial similarity. Indeed, some courts
have said that a plot as such is not protectible, and that "an author's exclusive rights are
largely confined to the details in the manner and method of his own presentation .... In
most instances, however, those courts that have denied protection to a "plot" have so
defined it as to be the equivalent of an abstract idea. Where plot is more properly defined
as "the 'sequence of events' by which the author expresses his 'theme' or 'idea,"' it
constitutes a pattern that is sufficiently concrete so as to warrant a finding of substantial
638 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA WREVIEW [Vol. 73
"fragmented literal similarity," and "comprehensive nonliteral simil-
arity,'26 rhetorical mechanisms courts use to find copyright infringe-
ment through the doctrines of substantial similarity or unauthorized
derivative works, even when the plaintiff and defendant works are quite
facially dissimilar.0 7 Widespread judicial application of the analysis
contained in this portion of the treatise has severely limited the ability
of authors to take inspiration from or reflect the influence of others'
creative works without fear of triggering copyright infringement lia-
bility.208 Risk-averse attorneys are likely to counsel their clients against
taking on the Nimmer treatise and potential plaintiffs simultaneously by
creating art that is even mildly similar to pre-existing copyright
protected works.
Ironically, the ease or difficulty with which substantial similarity can
be proven is something that large scale content owners are probably
ambivalent about in a global sense. When they are the plaintiffs in a
copyright infringement suit, certainly they pragmatically favor an easily
met test for substantial similarity for the purposes of the specific
litigation. However, when they find themselves defending against
copyright infringement claims, they are temporarily in favor of imposing
difficult substantial similarity proof obligations upon their opponents.
The test for substantial similarity is therefore not a policy determination
that many large scale content owners are likely to have a consistent view
about, and they are not likely to invest resources in permanently setting
any sort of rigid standard. In consequence, it is an area of copyright law
in which activists who favor low levels of copyright protections are likely
to be more effectively thwarted by the teachings of the Nimmer treatise
than by large media corporations.
One jurist, Judge Jon 0. Newman of the Second Circuit, went on
record as opposed to the over reliance by courts on the Nimmer treatise
in one particular context, the treatise's promotion of the "abstractions
similarity if it is common to both plaintiff's and defendant's works. Thus, one decision
expressly held that the copyright in a novel includes not "only the form of communication
or the mechanism employed" but also "the pattern of the story," adding: "The essence of
a novel or any other story for that matter, is the plot, plan, arrangement, characters and
dialogue therein contained and not simply its form of articulation."
(footnotes omitted).
206. Id. § 13.03 [A] [3]. The Nimmer treatise suggests these tests for substantial similarity, "fragmented
similarity" focusing upon copying of direct quotations and direct paraphrasing, and "comprehensive
nonliteral similarity" upon whether the fundamental essence or structure of a work has been duplicated.
Id. § 13.03[A] [1], [2]; seealso Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (1998); Twin
Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns. Int'l Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993). The latter concept sounds alarming
like copyright's "doctrine of equivalents."
207. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 65.
208. See id.
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test" as a tool for ascertaining the copyright protectable aspects of
computer programs. In a scholarly article judge Newman wrote:
Regrettably, Judge Hand's careful expression has not been sufficiently
read, and his idea has been often misunderstood. Starting in 1971,
courts began referring to an "abstractions test," thus pervertingJudge
Hand's sensible thought that the boundary between idea and expres-
sion cannot be fixed-not byjudges and surely not by anything to be
called a "test." Next, courts applied Nichols and what they unfortun-
ately called an "abstractions test" to areas of intellectual achievement
wholly different from plays, indeed, wholly different from writings.
Thus, courts have tried to apply an "abstractions test" to copyright
issues beyond the context of written texts and are now trying to apply
it to computer programs. IN DOING SO, THEY HAVE VERY LIKELY
BEEN INFLUENCED BY THIS SWEEPING ASSERTION IN NIMmER ON
COPYRIGHT: "Although the abstractions test was created for use with
literary works, it is readily adaptable to analyzing computer soft-
ware."
209
It is to his great credit that Judge Newman recognized the role a
treatise may have had in shaping what he characterized as bad law.
However, his concern appears limited to the widespread treatise-driven
adoption of a particular approach to assessing the content of computer
programs only. Earlier in the article he rhetorically positions the
Nimmer treatise as almost an embodiment of copyright law, writing:
[C]opyright law has enunciated two somewhat opposing proposi-
tions-that differences between an allegedly infringing work and a
copyrighted work will not preclude infringement, and that, as Nimmer
puts it, "a defendant may legitimately avoid infringement by intention-
ally making sufficient changes in a work which would otherwise be
regarded as substantially similar to that of the plaintiff's.,
21
1
He even tempers his critique of the treatise's position on the abstrac-
tions test issue by later noting:
Indeed, the Nimmer treatise, despite its fondness for an "abstractions
test" and an "abstraction-filtration-comparison test," has usefully
recognized that in the area of computer programs the line for distin-
guishing an unprotectable idea from a protectable expression "is a
pragmatic one, drawn not on the basis of some metaphysical property
of 'ideas,' but by balancing the need to protect the labors of authors
209. Jon 0. Newman, Nw Lyriesfor an Old Melody: he Idea/Expression Dichotonn' in the Computer Age, 17
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. Lj. 691, 694-95 (1999) (emphasis added).
210. ld.at 697.
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with the desire to assure free access to ideas." That sensible thought
has been embraced by our Court in CCC Information Services.2"
Newman appears to endorse a paradigm within which the Nimmer
treatise speaks for the copyright law when it is "correct," but should be
ignored or contravened when it is not. Though reinforcing the primacy
of the Nimmer treatise unnecessarily, this is a laudably contemplative
approach to treatise use to the extent that it compels independent
analysis of issues and of the consequences of adopting any given treatise
position.
VI. MINIMIZATION OF THE IMPACT OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Aimmer on Copyrght is cited extensively in judicial opinions, as is
discussed above. 2 ' Law review articles on copyright topics are not. 13
A series of searches performed on LexisNexis and Westlaw suggested
that while the Nimmer treatise has been cited by federal courts well over
2,000 times, few law review articles on copyright topics are cited by
courts at all, ever. Broadening the search to encompass entire bodies of
copyright oriented scholarship authored by even the most prolific and
well-regarded law professors2 14 still revealed a paucity of citations com-
pared with what the Nimmer treatise receives. Perhaps in the expecta-
tion that legal scholarship generally appraises the legal environment for
the purpose of positing avenues of improvement, it is assumed that law
review articles will therefore be unhelpful in illuminating copyright law
as it is. However, ifjudges and their clerks do not read legal scholarship
on copyright topics, they forgo the big picture case law assessments and
diverse policy critiques that copyright treatises do not provide, which
211. Id. at 699.
212. Se supra Part V.A.3.
213. Cf Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role ofScholarship in Federal Circuit
Patent LawJurisprudence, 39 HOUSTON L REv. 667, 681-82 (2002) ("I looked at the trademark and copyright
jurisprudence of the Second and Ninth Circuits. During the years 1996-2002, these courts of appeals, in
their copyright and trademark opinions, have cited to scholarship considerably more often than the Federal
Circuit has in its patent law opinions. But, like the Federal Circuit, the Second and Ninth Circuits are more
inclined to cite to a treatise than a law review article.").
214. For a listing ofthe "Top Ten Most Cited Law Faculty in the Intellectual Property Area" together
with number of citations for all Intellectual Property scholarly writings (including those on patent and
trademark topics), in other scholarly writings see, for example, New Educational Quality Rankings of U.S.
Law Schools, Most Cited Law Faculty: Top Ten Most Cited by Areas (2002-03), at http://www.utexas
.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings02/toplO_mostcited.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
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could lead to more informed and potentially improved judicial decision-
making. "15 The dearth of law review article citations in case law also
suggests either that judges do not appropriate cites from pleadings filed
by counsel, or that such citations are not present in prevailing briefs and
motions.
One troubling aspect of some of the numerous citations judges make
to the treatise is their collective tendency to frame the treatise as a
scholarly (rather than practitioner oriented) resource. Melville Nimmer
was on the full-time faculty of the UCLA School of Law, and David
Nimmer is affiliated with this institution as well.2" 6 In consequence, the
expostulations of the treatise are often referenced as the words and ideas
of "Professor Nimmer."'217 The Goldstein treatise is similarly anthropo-
morphized as "Professor Goldstein." The notion that legal scholars
need to author treatises to obtain the interested attention of the courts
is discouraging.
More surprising than the numerous citations to Atimmer on Copyright
within federal case law are the abundant citations to the treatise in law
review articles. Though the Nimmer treatise and those who use it may
not often cite law professors, law professors and other authors of legal
scholarship certainly cite Jimmer on Copyright. LexisNexis searches
demonstrate thatAimmer on Copyright has been cited in law review articles
almost 2,000 times,218 while a comparable Westlaw search uncovered
over 3,000 such citations. 219 There is not a single law review article on
a copyright topic that comes anywhere near this level of citation. There
isn't even a copyright scholar that comes close to this level of citation of
his or her entire body of copyright-related legal scholarship.
220
215. But see Gerald L. Neuman, Law RaiezeArticks That Bar/fire, 21 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 697 (1988)
(describing instances of, and mechanisms by which, good scholarship can lead to bad law); cfJustin Hughes,
Of Worl Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the Formation ofLegal Noms, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L. 155 (2003)
(discussing three issues about the role of academics in the formation of new legal norms surrounding the
Interct).
216. See UCLA School of Law, Faculty Biographies: David Nimmer, at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/bios (last updated Sept. 22, 2004).
217. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
218. A search on LexisNexis within the US and Canadian Law Reviews database composed of
"Nimmer w/25 copyright" on January 12, 2005 turned up 2,097 results, while a search composed of
"Nimmer w/5 copyright" turned up 1,912 in the same database.
219. A Westlaw search composed of "Nimmer w/25 copyright" in 'Journals and Law Reviews"
database on January 12, 2005 turned up 3,417 results, while a search composed of"Nimmerw/5 copyright"
turned up 3,107 in the same database.
220. See, e.g., New Educational Quality Rankings of U.S. Law Schools, supra note 214 (listing the
"Top Ten Most Cited Law Faculty in the Intellectual Property Area" together with number of citations for
all Intellectual Property scholarly writings (including those on patent and trademark topics), in other
scholarly writings, as follows: 1. Paul Goldstein with 970 citations, 2. Pamela Samuelson with 950 citations,
3. Donald Chisum with 940 citations, 4. Robert Merges with 880 citations, 5. Mark Lemley with 860
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VII. EXCEPTIONAL OR COMMONPLACE?
The hegemonic treatise phenomenon can arise with any sort of
treatise, and it is possible that there is nothing special (or especially
pernicious) about the manner in which copyright treatises are employed
relative to the influence and utilization rates of "leading" or "pre-
eminent" treatises in other subject areas. The impact of the Nimmer
treatise on copyright law may well pale in comparison to the effect that
perhaps Professor Laurence Tribe's treatise has had upon the evolution
of constitutional law, 221 or the extent to which Bernard Witkin's treatise
has captured and controlled the state law of California. 22 Whether the
jurisprudential concerns raised in this Article are widely applicable
remains an open and interesting question.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At some level it seems unfair to criticize the Nimmer or Goldstein
treatise, or any copyright treatise for that matter, for containing a few
mistakes, given the magnitude of the task of assembling copyright law
into a coherent and accessible narrative. This author concedes it is
unlikely that she could produce an equally comprehensive treatise that
is objectively more accurate. However, rather than being an argument
in favor of withholding criticism from treatises, it suggests that they need
to be extensively vetted, tested, and verified so that they are formulated
with the highest possible levels of reliability. In addition, treatise authors
should drop any pretense ofobjectiveness and neutrality. As one scholar
has observed:
Facial neutrality in treatise writing has had a long and important life.
It was the only permissible stance of formalists who thought of law as
science and who believed in right answers to legal problems. It was
also a sensible stance for legal realists who used process as a security
against unbridled discretion, and who sought "neutral principles" to
guide decisionmaking. It is hard to imagine, however, that treatises
can sustain neutrality in face of our current understanding of the
political nature of law. 3
citations, 6.Jane Ginsburg with 800 citations, 7. Rochelle Dreyfuss with 670 citations, 8. Edmund Kitch with
660 citations, 9. Wendy Gordon with 620 citations, and 10. Jessica Litman with 620 citations).
221. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, TRIHE's AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LX\\' (3d ed. 2000).
222. E.g., Witkin Legal Institute, In Memoriam Bernard Witkin, at http://wrw.witkin.com/pagcs/bc
_wtkin-pages/memorial.htm (last modified Aug. 8, 200 1).
223. Matasar, supra note 78, at 1516-17.
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The hegemony of any treatise poses grave but generally unrecognized
dangers to transparent and fully participatory judicial decisionmaking.
Though federal judges are not vulnerable to the sort of campaign contri-
bution-related influence peddling that plagues Congress, they are
susceptible to the lure of streamlined, prepackaged jurisprudence a
treatise can provide. That a treatise espouses certain normative views
and criticizes or excludes others may not be apparent to the harried
jurist and her clerks. When the treatise at issue is frequently cited,
seemingly straightforward, and carries with it the patina of long stable
authority, the temptation to utilize it industriously and repeatedly may
be irresistible, to judges and lawyers alike. Vigorous usage generates
ever more citations, which in turn further increase the visibility and
positive reputation of the treatise well beyond the bounds of legitimacy
for any secondary authority. All members of the legal profession need
to rely less on copyright treatises and focus more attention on the actual
cases that are changing or defining copyright laws and policies.
Alternatively, perhaps copyright law is now important enough to
warrant its own Restatement. The Restatement drafting process could
lead to some consensus and more consistency in copyright laws, or, at
a minimum, could air and publicize doctrinal disputes and the substance
of conflicting interpretations. Cases would be studied to discern what
courts were actually doing, whether independently or in reliance on
secondary authorities, and the reasoning underpinning these decisions
could be critiqued and reformulated.224
Treatise drafting by committee undoubtedly has drawbacks, and
policy choices developed by organized and interested groups of
attorneys do not always favor the public interest.22 Edward Rubin, who
served as Chair of the American Bar Association's Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems from 1986 to 1990, asked, in an excellent law
review article about the anti-consumer animus of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC): "[W]ould it not be wonderful if the
224. See geerally William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist and Secured Credit. Grant Gilmore, Common-Law
Courts, and iheArtcle 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1511, 1520-21 (1997):
Conventional wisdom holds that Restatements of Law gather common-lawjudicial decisions,
distill their wisdom, and articulate that wisdom in a way that will yield more clarity and
predictability in the law. A traditionalist can view Restatement projects as Legal Realism in
action - reformers study the cases to ascertain what courts actually do and then they
reformulate the reasoning to give a better voice to those actions. While Restatement projects
often choose a 'better' rule from conflicting decisions, at a fundamental level, the enterprise
is anchored in the judicial decisions. It is the direct and necessary connection to those
underlying judicial decisions that gives the Restatement process its legitimacy.
(footnotes omitted).
225. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lanyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist SomeNotes on the Process ofRevising
UC.C Articles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993).
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prestigious institutions that sponsored the UCC had placed themselves
at the forefront of legal developments and showed some sympathy for
ordinary people, rather than being the most retrograde force in their
field, and sympathizing only with commercial parties?, 226 He wrote in
the introductory footnote to this essay, "It is an understatement to say
that my views about the UCC do not reflect those of the ABA.,
2 7
Nevertheless, at least dissenting views have some ability to participate
in the Restatement drafting process and to publicly articulate their
criticisms of the resultant document, as Rubin was able to air his
concerns about the UCC. Whatever the shortcomings of the final
product, it would still serve to inexorably draw attention to the diverse
range of normative views of copyright law and policy and slowly deflate
the hegemony of the Nimmer treatise.
Finally, it would be disingenuous at best to pretend that this critique
of the use and abuse of copyright treatises was not rooted in sharp
differences of opinion with the treatment that specific treatises accord
particular copyright issues. Indeed, the very genesis of this scholarly
endeavor was sparked by one such passionate doctrinal disagreement.
Nevertheless, it is with those who engage in the unreflective adoption of
treatise recommendations that culpability for any resulting copyright
calamity resides.
226. Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH.
U.L.Q 11, 15 (1997).
227. Id at n.*.
